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Introduction 
“The world’s geopolitical holiday is over” (NOS, 2017). On February 20th, 2014, the Russian 
invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula shattered the world’s Post-Cold War 
honeymoon period of international stability through economic cooperation, which Francis 
Fukuyama (1989, 1992) had envisioned as “the end of history” (Allison, 2014; Kaukas, 2015). 
The Crimean annexation brought “old-fashioned power plays (…) back in[to] international 
relations (Mead, 2014, p.69). A Cold War-like state of geopolitical rivalry between East and 
West had resurfaced (Black & Johns, 2016; Plekhanov, 2016).  
However, since the Cold War was a clash between two superpowers, dominated by the 
high politics “of war and peace” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p.179), what would its return mean 
for the many small states born from and enabled by its demise? Would small states once more be 
reduced to background of international relations (IR), merely waiting to be acted upon by the 
larger powers dominating this “new world order” (Latynina, 2015, p.73)? It is this that IR theory 
blindly assumes (Bailes, Rickli & Thorhallsson, 2014; Rostoks, 2010; Steinmetz & Wivel, 
2010).  
However, ever since the Crimean “game-changer” (Gosu, 2015, p.37), the Baltic states of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have become increasingly active in high politics. Since these 
states are incapable of maintaining “a full spectrum of military capabilities” (Urbelis, 2015, p.13) 
vis-à-vis an increasingly belligerent Russian Federation, they require concrete military support 
from the West and NATO (Männik, 2008). Yet, before the Crimean Crisis, NATO had been 
discursively unwilling to acknowledge the existence of a Russian threat, let alone commit such 
reinforcements to the Baltics. Hence, to ensure their national survival, the Baltics must directly 
confront the larger powers that dominate the realm of high politics and determine its direction.  
However, due to their precarious geopolitical position, directly in the path of an 
aggressive predatory neighbor, IR theory holds Baltic survival as theoretically impossible 
(Kassimeris, 2009; Van Houtum, 2005). Yet, strikingly, since the Crimean Crisis, NATO has 
changed its discourse, acknowledged the existence of a Russian threat, and has committed 
material and troops to the Baltic states (Rostoks & Vanaga, 2016). Subsequently, an impossible 
reality seems to emerge. Hence, this thesis proposes that the Baltics themselves are the architects 
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of NATO’s discursive shift; that they have woken NATO up to “the enduring global threat 
[Russia] really represents” (Breedlove, 2016, p.96); that small has steered large. 
The central questions, here, are how such an impossibility can come to be and what its 
ramifications are. Therefore, this thesis endeavors to answer the following question and to 
propose a concrete strategy for small state action on its bases, constructing a much-needed 
critique on IR scholarship in the process. What strategy could afford the small Baltic states 
influence over and the ability to secure concrete military commitments from NATO, to enhance 
their level of national security in the wake of the Crimean Crisis? 
 This thesis will develop along four sections. Section one will review the appropriate 
literature to find a strategy of small state resilience in high politics. Section two sets out the 
employed methodology. Section three will systematically present and discuss the results of the 
conducted analysis. Finally, section four will provide a small overview, answer the posed 
research question and discuss its implications. 
Literature Review 
As briefly lamented above, small states have attracted a disproportionally small level of scholarly 
interest, something this thesis aims to remedy (Hey, 2003; Veenendaal & Corbett, 2014). This 
academic disinterest is not aided by an ongoing debate about what such a classification of size at 
all entails, for both the small state and the entities against which this ‘smallness’ is defined 
(Cooper & Shaw, 2013; Hey, 2003; Neumann & Gstöhl, 2006; Vital, 1971). Yet, an attempt to 
remedy this definitional feud is beyond the scope of this thesis. Hence, this section aims to 
uncover an appropriate strategy for small state resilience in high politics, and small states in 
general. 
Classic Interpretations of Small State Power 
Usually, when small states are awarded scholarly attention, assessments of their survival 
are relatively unfavorable (Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006). In the words of Anthony Payne (2004, 
p.21), “vulnerabilities rather than opportunities are the most striking consequence of smallness.” 
This view is shared and borne out by the two classic or grand theories in IR, realism and 
liberalism (Bailes, Rickli & Thorhallson, 2014; Wivel, Bailes & Archer, 2014). These theories 
are underpinned by a concept of power, the only difference being its definition. Hence, these 
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classic theories pay no more than forced lip-service to the uneasy existence of weak states within 
their theoretical models (Donnelly, 2000; Guzzini, 1998; Spegele, 1996).  
First, realism can best be introduced as a “skeptical and power-materialist world-view” 
(Guzzini, 1998, p.186). Meaning that “international relations [is] largely a realm of power and 
interest” (Donnelly, 2000, p.9). In this model, states are locked in the inevitable pursuit, 
accruement and employment of military power – i.e., the constant conducting of high politics. 
Subsequently, small states, defined by their incapability “to maintain a full spectrum of military 
capabilities” (Urbelis, 2015, p.63), are incapable of conducting high politics and therefore 
incapable of guaranteeing their own security, placing them at the mercy of their larger 
counterparts (De Wijk, 2005; Knudsen, 2007). Therefore, small states are perceived not actors, 
but as the playballs of international relations, devoid of agency, only moving when acted upon 
by a power of consequence (Guzzini, 1996; Snyder, 2014). 
Second, with power defined in terms of non-rivalrous economic capacity, liberalism 
somewhat qualifies this outright dismissal of small state agency. “In IR, liberalism is often taken 
to mean [economic] cooperation via processes such as democratization, interdependence, and the 
spread of international organizations” (Buzan & Lawson, 2015, p.102). Here, small states do 
have some role to play. Since their economies are too small to function in a state of autarky, 
small states are the most vocal supporters of international economic institution-building and rule-
based trade. They are in fact highly dependent upon it (Doyle, 2014; East, 1973; Prasad, 2013). It 
is within this context of international economic cooperation, that liberalism recognizes small 
states as the beneficiaries of economic cooperation. 
However, this recognition is rather ambivalent (Heywood, 2014). Even though small 
states are recognized as present, their position is marred by perpetual passivity. Since their 
economic capacity, defined as power within the liberal model, is too small to influence the 
organizations of which they are a part. Hence, they are once again reduced to the background 
(Doyle, 2014; Heywood, 2014). Moreover, the very inception of this order is the product of 
interaction between powerful economies, since only they “can provide the framework that small 
states can plug into with their available assets” (Urbelis, 2015, p.63). Consequently, liberalism-
inspired small state scholarship remains underdeveloped. 
In sum, realism and liberalism are fundamentally unaccommodating to small states. 
While the former dismisses any small state resilience outright, the latter does so on a rather more 
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convoluted basis. Hence, neither of these theories are appropriate frameworks for small state 
action. 
The Constructivist Turn 
With the emergence of social constructivism, pioneered by Alexander Wendt (1992), the 
first steps towards addressing the structural disregard of small states in IR were set. This theory 
regards inter-state relations not as a product of objective material capacities, but as the interplay 
of socially constructed norms and identities (Katzenstein, 1996; Kolodziej, 2005). In Wendt’s 
words: “anarchy is what states make of it.” Meaning that international politics, and thus (small) 
state survival, is not built upon the inevitabilities assumed under the classic theories of IR, but 
rather is subject to constant construction and reconstruction between the entities concerned. 
Hence, smallness was no longer paradigmatically equated to inevitable inconsequence (Bailes, 
2015). 
Norm Entrepreneurship: Towards Universal Resilience? 
Ever since this “constructivist turn in international relations theory” (Checkel, 1998, p. 324), an 
increasing number of studies regarding small state resilience have been conducted (Browning, 
2006; Cooper, 2013; Marshall, 2013). Yet, Christine Ingebristen’s (2002) seminal theory of 
‘norm entrepreneurship’ was the first attempt at defining a framework for universal small state 
resilience.  
Following Wendt (1992), Ingebritsen perceives the international system as a global civil 
society, built upon intersubjective norms. Consequently, these norms, are subject to constant 
change and can therefore be manipulated by the entities within this society. A norm entrepreneur 
does exactly this. By promoting a certain norm, often congruent with its national interests and 
history, it attempts to gain “support for particular standards of appropriateness” (Ingebritsen, 
2002, p.12). Such standards impose a kind of virtuous behavior upon their proponents, which 
guides “the choices available to states in international politics” (Ingebritsen, 2002, p.13) towards 
an outcome favorable to the norm entrepreneur (Baldacchino, 2013). Henceforth, norm 
entrepreneurship affords states access to and virtuous leadership over new policy areas 
(Björkdahl, 2008).  
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An example of norm entrepreneurship is the focus of small island development states 
(SIDS) on climate change (Clemencon, 2016). With their remote and low-lying territories, SIDS 
are existentially threatened by the rising sea levels, as a product of climate change (Brecht, 
Dasgupta, Laplante, Murray & Wheeler, 2012). It is here that, through their national experiences 
and the consequent exploitation of norms, these SIDS have managed to place the question of 
climate change on the international agenda and ascended to leadership positions on ecological 
policy (Fry, 2016; Hoad, 2015). Moreover, such positions are not merely symbolic. The Paris 
Climate Accords, as an SIDS initiative, successfully structured the policy options open to the 
entire world, including its largest states (Hoad, 2016). 
However, while certain instances of norm entrepreneurship have been critically reviewed 
(Björkdahl, 2007), the very foundations of the theory have escaped evaluation. Subsequently, 
this thesis will pioneer such a holistic critique of norm entrepreneurship. 
First, the definition of small state resilience, as the product of norm entrepreneurship, is 
never concretely discussed. It can best be explained as the capacity to successfully gain entrance 
to an unoccupied part of international relations, a niche section where larger states either have 
yet to express their interests or do not seek influence in the first place. Instead of considering 
large and small states as different but equally significant categories, norm entrepreneurship 
advises small states to move in such a fashion that large states do not notice or mind small state 
activity. As under the classic theories, small states are constituted as the negative derivative of 
their larger counterparts, existing at their behest. Hence, resilience is perverted into avoidance. 
Second, since resilience equals the successful avoidance of confrontation, not all sectors 
of international politics are open for small state activity. Those small states that find themselves 
in precarious geopolitical situations, their national security in constant peril, are incapable of 
exploring new sectors, since the primary factors that afford such ventures – territorial integrity 
and state survival – must first be secured (Bartmann, 2002; Jæger, 2000). Yet, the sector of 
politics that controls such factors, is the realm of high politics (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007). 
Where, since it is already colonized by larger states, accession equals confrontation, rendering 
resilience into vulnerability. Hence, as in realism, such assumptions preclude small states from 
accessing high politics and thus theoretically dismiss their survival. 
Moreover, when this critique is connected to the aforementioned example, a wholly different 
reality emerges. Essentially, small state leadership in the sector of environmental policy was 
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mainly afforded by the Cold War-Era preoccupation of large powers with military affairs. 
However, as the larger powers widened their gaze towards more diverse sectors of security, such 
as environmental security, their interests and influence inevitably followed (Buzan, 1995). 
Hence, larger states started to exert influence, compromising both the position and policy of its 
smaller section leaders. US president Trump’s recent decision to exit the Paris Climate Accords, 
upon which SIDS survival hinges, since it opposes US interests, is telltale (BBC, 2017). 
Therefore, due to such underlying tones of vulnerability, in the guise of a realism-esque 
assumption that small states are incapable of gaining any traction in high politics, the theory of 
norm entrepreneurship is entirely inadequate as a strategy for universal small state resilience in 
international relations.  
Securitization: Speech as Reality 
Even though the above reviewed theory of norm entrepreneurship has been judged as inadequate 
to the present case, this does not disqualify the constructivist foundations upon which it is built. 
It is here that the theory of securitization, as pioneered by Barry Buzan (1991, 1995) and Ole 
Wæver (1995, 2000), is introduced (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015).  
As opposed to norm entrepreneurship, securitization extends opportunities for influence 
not just to niche corners of international policy, but holds that “an ever-widening range of issues” 
is open for interaction (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998, p.1). Moreover, it provides states with 
a framework of action in all “sectors of security” (Buzan et al, 1998, p.21). Additionally, based 
on its constructivist roots, the theory of securitization holds that the meaning of security is 
neither inevitable nor predetermined, but constructed by the actors that employ the concept 
(Lipschutz, 1995). Therefore, securitization “is a speech act where a securitizing actor designates 
a threat to a specified referent object [which is to be secured] and declares an existential threat, 
implying the right [if not the obligation] to use extraordinary measures to fence it off” (Wæver, 
2000, p.251). Thus, “by saying [security], something is done” (Wæver, 1995, p.55); a threat is 
created (Salter, 2008; Stritzel, 2007). 
In other words, securitization can be defined as the discursive attempt to frame an issue 
as a threat to the existence of a certain entity, which is to be secured at all costs (Risse, 2000; 
Taureck, 2006). This threat creation allows the securitizing actor, the actor engaged in the 
process of securitization, to invoke what Andrew Neal (2009, p.57) calls a state of 
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exceptionalism, taking “primacy over normal politics.” Under this state of exception, the 
employment of special measures, to remove the threat and render safe the referent object, is 
legitimized (Agamben, 2005; McDonald, 2008). Measures that, without the exceptional and 
therefore legitimizing presence of the threat in question, would be unequivocally dismissed.  
For the Baltic states, securitization is a relevant strategy. Since, one the one hand, it does 
not preclude small state access to high politics and, on the other hand, provides them with a 
workable strategy for achieving this access. Moreover, it is only when NATO accepts Russia as 
an existential threat that troop deployments to the Baltics will be legitimized and possibly 
exacted. A situation which is unlikely under the end of history doctrine (Irvine, 2016). Therefore, 
the following expectation is central to the present thesis: To secure military support from NATO 
and guarantee their national security, the Baltic states are expected to engage in speech acts, to 
securitize Russia as a threat to the wider alliance and offer military deployments to the Baltics as 
the exceptional measures required to ameliorate the common Russian threat. 
However, for securitization to succeed, certain conditions must be satisfied. Wæver 
(2000, p.252) calls these conditions ‘felicity conditions.’ The first of these conditions concerns 
the “social capital of the enunciator,” or the authority of the securitizing actor (Wæver, 2000, 
p.252). Without this authority, the securitizing actor cannot command the attention of the 
audience subject to the speech act in question. In the present case, such authority can be 
established through referencing a) national history with and experience in negotiating the 
identified threat (Wæver, 2000), b) prior attempts at securitization of the said threat (the ‘I told 
you so’ factor), and c) through cooperation with other like-minded actors (Jæger, 2000; Kojala & 
Keršanskas, 2015; Lamoreaux, 2014; Rostoks & Vanaga, 2016).  
Hence, the fate of the central expectation is expected to be dependent upon the level of 
authority commanded by the Baltic states. The following supportive expectation is introduced: 
To increase the chance of successful securitization, the Baltic states are expected to attempt to 
explicitly assert their authority as securitizing actors, through referencing national history, 
national experience in negotiating the identified threat, prior attempts at securitizing the 
identified threat, and through acting in concert with other like-minded states. 
Second, since securitization is an intersubjective process, concerning the construction of 
meaning and the consequent structuring of reality, the audience and the wider context against 
which the issue is to be securitized, is of the utmost importance (Balzacq, 2011a; Léonard & 
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Kaunert, 2011). As Thierry Balzacq (2005, p.179) notes, “an effective securitization is highly 
context-dependent. [Additionally], an effective securitization is audience-centered.” Therefore, if 
securitization is to be successful, the securitizing actor must recognize and coopt the values and 
interests of the audience in question (Balzacq, 2005).  
Following Jeremy Lamoreaux (2014), with NATO as its audience and Crimea as its 
context, the Baltic states must refer to a) shared and fundamental values, b) alliance foundations, 
c) held commitments towards the audience – the emphasizing of reciprocity – and d) relevant 
domestic policy changes, if securitization to succeed (Honkanen, 2014; Urbelis, 2015). 
Therefore, the validation or falsification of the central expectation is expected to hinge upon the 
ability of the Baltics to engage with their audience: To increase the chance of successful 
securitization, the Baltic states are expected to attempt to coopt their audience, by referencing 
those shared and foundational values, held commitments, and domestic policy changes relevant 
to their audience. 
In sum, the securitization theory is expected to be the strategy that affords the small 
Baltic states the largest chance of influencing NATO and securing those troop deployments 
required to address the Russian threat and salvage national security. However, the other theories 
reviewed blindly dismiss such notions of resilience outright. Subsequently, following IR 
literature, Baltic-led securitization, as an instance of small state agency in high politics, is 
expected to be a wholly impossible phenomenon.  
Method 
This section will introduce the methodology of this thesis. First, it will consider the main 
concepts upon which the analysis is built. Second, it will introduce the selected cases and their 
theoretical significance. Third, the employed research design will be set out. Finally, the 
different methods of data collection will be described. 
Conceptualizations and Operationalizations 
As is evident, two central concepts animate the present analysis, namely: ‘small states’ and 
‘influence.’  
Despite “the considerable literature devoted to defining small states (…) no widely 
accepted definition (…) has yet emerged” (Crowards, 2002, p.143). Yet, to answer the research 
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question and nuance the classic IR theories, “clarity of what this analytical concept of the small 
state entails is,” nonetheless, required (Maass, 2009, p.66). Following Maass (2009, p.68-69), to 
arrive at such clarity, it is important to recognize that a definitional answer is two-sided, focusing 
on what type of entity can at all be classified as a ‘state’ and what constitutes its possible 
‘smallness.’ 
First, a ‘state’ is “a political community formed by a territorial population subject to one 
government” (Hague & Harrop, 2013, p.13). This government must possess the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force within its territory and be recognized by its peers (Karns & Mingst, 2010, 
p.64). Second, what renders such an entity ‘small’ is the size of this territorial population (Bailes, 
2009; Crowards, 2002). Here, its “population is not regarded as a single criterion, but rather” as 
the core from which all national perceptions emanate. Hence, population size structures the 
direction of a state’s policies and strategies (Bailes, 2009). However, it does not destine its 
international position as either vulnerable or resilient, as is so often wrongfully assumed. 
In more tangible terms, UN-membership – as international recognition – is generally 
adopted as the verification of statehood (Maass, 2009). This thesis will follow that precedent. 
Furthermore, to determine what population size categorizes a state as ‘small,’ is to recognize that 
such an endeavor is inherently arbitrary and context-specific (Crowards, 2002, p.171; Hey, 2003, 
p.3; Maass, 2009, p.76). Therefore, to address this arbitrariness as adequately as possible, this 
thesis will employ the cut-off proposed by Alyson Bailes (2009, p.2): a population of 5 million 
or less. This definition is tailored to the Northern European security context, encompassing the 
cases under review. In this context, those states residing under the cut-off point are generally 
“thought of as small by other Europeans and their North American and Russian neighbors” 
(Bailes, 2009, p.2) – i.e., their primary interactive partners. 
The concept of ‘influence’ is equally elusive in its definition. This thesis regards 
influence as relative capacity (Morgenthau, 1972). However, this capacity is not invariably tied 
to a state’s size. Contrarily, it is mainly discursive, its extent socially constructed. Hence, 
capacities such as armies are mere building blocks, not the bread and butter. Thus, influence is 
defined as the act of compelling another state or group of states to do something outside of their 
expressed interests (Heywood, 2014). In the context of the present analysis, the Baltic states will 
have influenced NATO if it commits troops to the Baltic states, something NATO has not done 
before the Crimean Crisis. 
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Case Selection 
Since this thesis takes the form of a case study, the details of which will be set out below, the 
selection of relevant cases is based on the “theoretical prominence of a given case” (Seawright & 
Gerring, 2008, p.295), rather than the processes of random sampling employed in quantitative 
research (Bryman, 2012; Collier & Mahoney, 1996).  
As mentioned, this thesis considers the positions of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania vis-à-vis NATO. These three states became UN member-states in 1991, after 
regaining independence from Soviet Union (Van Ham, 1995). Furthermore, their populations 
count 1.3 million, 1.9 million, and 2.8 million respectively (Central Intelligence Agency World 
Fact Book, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). Hence, the Baltics can be identified as ‘small states,’ under the 
definitions presented above. To address their proximity to Russia, the Baltic states aspired 
NATO membership, its collective defense clause regarded as the answer to their security 
dilemmas (Molis, 2008). This accession was granted in 2004 (Jurkynas, 2014). 
Moreover, it is the discursive opposition between NATO and the Baltics before the 
Crimean Crisis and the sudden harmony afterwards that is of interest. The former was rather 
skeptical of Baltic accession and feared troop deployments to be provoking to Russia and 
harmful to international security (Coker, 2014; Männik, 2004). The latter lamented this 
“umbrella on paper” (Weymouth, 2017) as enabling, not balancing, Russia (McNamara, 2016). 
Post- Crimea, these positions were harmonized in the latter. How did this occur? If this shift was 
the product of Baltic influence, all assumptions of small state vulnerability must be reconsidered. 
It is this potentially groundbreaking deviance from IR theory that renders the small Baltics 
relevant. 
Research Design & Methods of Data Collection 
This thesis will follow a deviant case study design, as identified by Jack Levy (2008). Hence, 
this thesis aims to “focus on [an] observed empirical anomaly in existing theoretical 
propositions, with the aim of explaining why [and how] the case deviates from theoretical 
expectations and in the process refining the existing theory” (Levy, 2008, p.13, emphasis in 
original). To get an understanding of how such deviance arises is fundamental, though often 
disregarded. A case study fits such aims perfectly, since it allows for “an intensive study of a 
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single unit [or group of units] with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units” (Gerring, 
2004, p.341; Yin, 2009). 
To this end, this thesis will employ the following methods of data collection: process-
tracing, discourse analysis, and face-to-face interviews (Bryman, 2012). Process-tracing, is 
defined by David Collier (2011, p.824) as a “tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences 
from diagnostic pieces.” This tool will be employed to trace the process of the securitization of 
Russia in the Baltic states, upon which any international attempts at securitization will inevitably 
be based, and the construction and implications of NATO’s discourse of constructive 
engagement. 
Second, since the speech act, by which “reality is produced and made real through 
discourses” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p.3) is central to securitization, Thierry Balzacq (2011b) 
proposes a structured analysis of such discourses as the prime strategy for research (Buzan & 
Hansen, 2009; Floyd, 2011). For this discourse analysis (e.g., Wodak & Meyer, 2008), the digital 
archives of NATO and the Baltic ministries of foreign affairs were scoured for relevant material. 
These documents, ranging from speeches to strategic concepts, were selected on their reference 
to a Russian threat or the Crimean Crisis. Overall, a total of 119 documents was subjected to 
analysis, consisting of 30 NATO documents, 34 on Latvia, 28 on Lithuania, 26 on Estonia, and 1 
on Poland, the most representative of which will be presented below. These documents were 
judged on the presence or absence of a certain topic or argument, relevant to the guiding 
expectations set out above. The coding scheme for this analysis can be found in table 1. 
However, while Ken Booth (2007) recognizes the importance of the discourse analysis to 
securitization research, he warns that such a discourse-centric approach could miss “chunks of 
reality, (…) based on the fallacy that threats do not exist outside of discourse;” that the only real 
threats worthy of analysis are those successfully securitized through speech acts (Balzacq, 2005). 
Hence, to avoid such discursive overdeterminism, Alan Bryman (2012) recommends a process of 
triangulation, in which the results of multiple research methods are juxtaposed (Thies, 2002). 
Table 1 
Coding scheme discourse analysis 
Expectation Central Supportive 1 Supportive 2 Counter 
Indicator 1 Claims of Russia 
as a threat to 
Reference to 
national history or 
Reference to shared 
and fundamental 
Absence of 
such 
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NATO experience values factors 
Indicator 2 X Reference to prior 
attempts of 
securitization 
Reference to alliance 
foundations 
X 
Indicator 3 X Cooperation with 
like-minded partners 
Reference to held 
commitments 
X 
Indicator 4 
 
X X Reference to 
relevant domestic 
policy changes 
X 
Therefore, to provide the overall analysis with a concrete connection to reality, lacking in 
most related literature, this thesis also employs face-to-face interviews (Opdenakker, 2006). 
Since the present analysis concerns the foreign policy of the Baltic states, prime candidates for 
interviewing were found in the Baltic diplomatic missions to the Netherlands. Interviews have 
been conducted with, respectively, Mr. Mati Murd, Councilor of the Embassy of the Republic of 
Estonia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Mr. Darius Semaška, Ambassador of the Republic of 
Lithuania to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and Ms. Dace Dobrāja, Deputy Head of the 
Mission of the Republic of Latvia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Transcripts for these 
interviews can be found in appendices A, B, and C respectively. 
Two important remarks remain. First, due to security concerns, there is no full transcript 
available for the interview with Ms. Dobrāja. However, appendix C presents a transcript of the 
researcher’s notes which have been verified by the respondent. Second, these interviews have 
been conducted under the banner of the Leiden University Honours College thesis expansion. 
Analysis 
In this section, the research results will be analyzed, to either verify or falsify the relevant 
expectations and answer the central research question: What strategy could afford the small 
Baltic states influence over and the ability to secure concrete military commitments from NATO, 
to enhance their level of national security in the wake of the Crimean Crisis? 
This section will present a brief overview of the context in which securitization is 
expected to unfold. Additionally, each expectation underpinning this research will be juxtaposed 
to and judged upon evidence found through the discourse analysis and interviews respectively.  
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The Russian Factor: The Basis of Authority? 
Securitization is an intersubjective process, in which the interplay between the authority of the 
securitizing actor and interests of the audience determines the outcome (Balzacq, 2011, p.3). 
Even though the expected process of securitization is between state actors, its success is 
nonetheless dependent on the prior domestic history with the threat in question (Wæver, 2000). 
Since, if a certain threat is not held as credible domestically, the required jumping board for 
international securitization is absent. Thus, “where a history of hostile sentiments exists,” 
securitization more easily follows (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2013, p.96).  
The Baltics, while different in many regards, are united by an ingrained apprehension 
towards Russia (Nikitina, 2014; Sakkov, 2014). However, the securitization of Russia is not the 
product of the Crimean Crisis, but dates to at least the beginning of the Second World War, when 
the Soviet Union annexed the then freshly independent Baltic states (Aalto, 2003; Noreen, 2007). 
Even though the Soviets pushed out the Germans, they were no liberators; they were simply 
another occupant, their presence irreconcilable with Baltic national survival (Bajarūnas, 1995; 
Haab, 1995; Viksne, 1995). 
However, even with the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian threat was not ameliorated, 
since the newly born Russian Federation continued to meddle in Baltic domestic affairs 
(Jurkynas, 2014). This, combined with Russia’s reverence of Soviet glory, projected upon it 
those antagonistic sentiments previously reserved to the Soviet Union (Morozov & Rumelili, 
2012). Moreover, through the processes of state and nation-building, this ‘Russian factor’ 
became enmeshed with the Baltic identity (Molis, 2008). Independence was independence from 
Russia. Security was security from Russia. Ironically, in asserting this relative safety, the Baltics 
created in Russia their ‘other’ and securitized Russia as everything they are not; as “the stranger 
[which] is always approaching” (Ahmed, 2010, p.22; Solska, 2011).  
In short, the domestic securitization of Russia was successful, its outcome immortalized 
in the very Baltic identity. Even in safety, the Baltics continuously look over their shoulder. It is 
this history upon which a securitizing actor can and is expected to build. The first felicity 
condition is satisfied, international securitization of the Russian threat is enabled. 
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Constructive Engagement: A Blinded Audience? 
Since, an “effective securitization is audience-centered” (Balzacq, 2005, p.179), it is paramount 
to recognize the positions of the audience and the contexts in which they exist. Furthermore, the 
securitizing actor must identify and seize those moments, which Sarah Pralle (2009, p.784) calls 
policy windows, when the audience’s discourse is at its weakest (Balzacq, 2011a).  
As mentioned, the audience addressed by the Baltics is NATO. This actor, at the end of 
the Cold War, was convinced that conventional military security issues had been laid to rest once 
and for all (Jakniunaite, 2016). NATO, consequently, “assumed that Russia shared their basic 
domestic and foreign policy goals and would gradually come to embrace Western-style 
democracy at home and liberal norms abroad” (Lukin, 2014, p.85; Möller, 2003). If anything, 
even in response to events such as the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Western military build-up was 
perceived as potentially interfering with Russia’s inevitable Westernization process (Coker, 
2014). Hence, the Russo-Georgian War was perceived as an incident, requiring only patience to 
be solved (Raik, 2016). Thus, West mirrored upon Russia an image of itself, blinding it to 
reality. 
Yet, not all allies conducted their foreign policy in front of a mirror. The small Baltic 
states, dependent on NATO for their national security and thus expected to simply follow its 
lead, were alarmed at NATO’s “other priorities” (D. Dobrāja, personal interview, June 15th, 
2017, p.83). Ever since independence the Baltics had been aware of and threatened by “Russia’s 
malign activities” (Marmei, 2017, p.2). Hence, the Baltic states attempted to seize Georgia as a 
policy window, as “favorable moment” (D. Semaška, personal interview, May 16th, 2017, p.71), 
to securitize Russia. Yet, as Estonian president Kersti Kaljulaid (Weymouth, 2017) noted, 
Georgia “blew over very quickly” However, for the Baltics, “Georgia can’t be forgotten” (Irvine, 
2016). 
In sum, before the Crimean Crisis, NATO’s discourse was entirely opposed to 
recognizing a Russian threat. The Baltics, using the 2008 Russo-Georgian War as a policy 
window, attempted to change this discourse through securitization (McNamara, 2016). However, 
it failed. Regardless of this failure, the Baltics have gained all-important experience in engaging 
an audience and identifying policy windows. Experiences which enable future attempts. 
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Main Expectation: Influence through Securitization 
On February 20
th
, 2014, Russia invaded Crimea. This thesis expects this event to be the policy 
window required that would lead to a successful securitization of Russia vis-à-vis NATO. Hence, 
to secure military support from NATO and guarantee their national security, the Baltic states are 
expected to engage in speech acts, to securitize Russia as a threat to the wider alliance and offer 
military deployments to the Baltics as the exceptional measures required to ameliorate the 
common Russian threat.  
Main Expectation: Discourse Analysis 
This section will outline the Baltic and NATO responses to the Russian land-grab. Moreover, it 
will detail NATO’s strategies vis-à-vis Russia before and after the Crimean Crisis, to properly 
judge the expectation. 
First, the Lithuanian response was unequivocal in its message: Russia is “a predatory 
neighbor whose hands are stained with blood” (Ukraine Today, 2014). Since, “in Ukraine, 
Russia demonstrated that it does not shy away from invading [a] sovereign country” (Kriščiūnas, 
2017, p.2). Consequently, Russia is “not only threatening its neighbors, but is also organizing 
[and engaging in] a war against its neighbors,” Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė warned 
(Weymouth, 2014a). Furthermore, since “the protection of [NATO] lies in the Baltic states” 
(Weymouth, 2017a), “Russia must be held accountable” (Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, 2016a). 
Moreover, “it is clear that [Putin] will use any space left to him to provoke” NATO (Weymouth, 
2017a). The only way to restrict this space, a product of NATO’s attempts “to build a strategic 
partnership with Russia” (Kriščiūnas, 2017, p.1), and render safe all NATO allies, Lithuanian 
foreign minister Linas Linkevičius (Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, 2016b) argues, “a clearly 
visible and palpable presence of the allies” in the Baltic states is required – i.e., the deployment 
of “troops on [Baltic] territory” (Weymouth, 2017a).  
Latvia “accentuated that the annexation of Crimea by Russia leaves a negative impact on 
[European] security (…), for which NATO continues playing a decisive role” (Latvian Foreign 
Ministry, 2014). Furthermore, “the [Russian] threat is to global stability” (Rinkēvičs, 2015), 
since “the entire Euro-Atlantic area is interconnected and there is no such thing as separate 
security of the Baltic states” (Latvian Foreign Ministry, 2017). Moreover, this Euro-Atlantic 
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security is threatened by the Russian desire to “just take territory, keep it and take as much as [it] 
can” (Goncharenko, 07-05-2015), which is a “blatant violation of international law” (Rinkēvičs, 
Appendix D, p.90). Additionally, since “Russia’s actions vis-à-vis its neighbors show a 
disturbing and worrisome trend that [Latvia has] to reckon with” (Teikmanis, 2017, p.1), Latvia 
stresses NATO “solidarity” as the only solution (Teikmanis, 2017, p.2). Solidarity “in a powerful 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (Latvian Foreign Ministry, 2016a) with an “appropriate (…) 
presence in all the Baltic states” (Latvian Foreign Ministry, 2014). 
Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Roivas warns that, if Russia thinks it can “change borders 
of foreign countries by force, (…) there is no question [its] aggressive behavior has made Russia 
a threat” (Schmitt, 2016) “to NATO, [and] particularly to its eastern-flank Allies” (Clark, Luik, 
Ramms & Shirreff, 2016, p.6). Furthermore, since “there is a [Russian] wish (…) to destroy the 
Western security model” (Weymouth, 2017b), the West must “revisit [and dismiss] this illusory 
partnership that exists between NATO and Russia,” president Toomas Ilves stressed (Weymouth, 
2014b). Interaction “shouldn’t be guided by [pre-Crimean] wishful thinking but by real facts, 
[Since] Russia (…) cannot be trusted” to abide by its promises (Marmei, 2017, p.1). Hence, 
NATO must send a “clear signal” (Estonian Foreign Ministry, 2017) and “meet this challenge 
with resolve, strength” (Kaljurand, 2016) and “a more substantial forward presence in the most 
exposed NATO Allies” (Clark et al, 2016, p.6). 
However, when comparing these long held Baltic positions to NATO’s pre-Crimean 
priorities, the two stand utterly opposed. Upon review of the Strategic Concept adopted at the 
2010 Lisbon Summit, the following directives appear: “we will seek active cooperation (…) with 
Russia” (NATO, 2010, p.5); “NATO-Russian cooperation is of strategic importance as it 
contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security” (NATO, 2010, p.10); 
and, NATO wants “to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia” (NATO, 2010, 
p.10). Such statements contradict entirely the standpoints adopted by the Baltics, even before 
Crimea.  
Moreover, when these positions are juxtaposed to the official press release following the 
2014 Wales Summit, a telltale shift appears. Post-Crimea, NATO admits that “Russia’s 
aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, 
free, and at peace” (NATO, 2014a, p.1). This position was expounded during the 2016 Warsaw 
Summit, stating that “Russia’s aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the 
18 
 
periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain policy goals by the threat 
and use of force, are a source of regional instability, fundamentally challenge the alliance, [and] 
have damaged Euro-Atlantic security” (NATO, 2016, p.2). Hence, NATO no longer stresses a 
“strategic partnership” with Russia (NATO, 2010, p.10), rather Russia has “damaged” alliance 
security (NATO, 2016, p.2). 
Main Expectation: Interviews 
During the interviews, the respondents agreed that the Crimean Crisis was “painful, but helpful;” 
that it “served [the Baltic] case, which is a tragic statement, since it is such a tragic event, but it 
is true” (D. Dobrāja, p.85). Therefore, “Crimea was indeed a wake-up call for the west,” all three 
respondents argued (D. Dobrāja, p.85). “It was a wake-up call in that sense that some countries 
and some politicians, whose priority was to keep relations with Russia in the best place, (…) 
[understood] that enough is enough (…) That there are red lines that were crossed” (M. Murd, 
p.39). 
 Moreover, the Baltics “were the ones who [continuously] rang the alarm bell” (D. 
Dobrāja, p.84). Even “before what happened in Georgia, starting with the [1999] Chechen wars” 
(M. Murd, p.), the Baltics started to “see the pattern here” (M. Murd, p.47) and were “issuing 
messages (…), [that] something will happen” (D. Semaška, p.69), both regarding 2008 and 2014. 
But, “there was nothing much to do about what happened in Georgia” (D. Dobrāja, p.84), since 
the West had “other priorities” (D. Dobrāja, p.83). The “effort to engage Russia was so strong” 
(D. Semaška, p.70) that NATO “paid [not] much attention to [its] own security” (D. Dobrāja, 
p.83). Hence, with Crimea as its “favorable moment” (D. Semaška, p.71), the Baltics “were like 
a [securitizing] locomotive” (D. Dobrāja, p.84) in getting NATO to accept that “Russia cannot be 
trusted” (D. Dobrāja, p.87). 
When asked for the specific dimensions of this Russian threat, the respondents identified 
two interconnected areas: societal and military. Here, “we are talking about hybrid threats” (M. 
Murd, p.48), which combine societal and military factors. On the societal part, there is “an 
information war” between the Baltics and Russia (D. Semaška, p.63), through which the latter is 
“very actively trying (…) to meddle into [the Baltic] Russian-speaking community, (…) [as] they 
did in Ukraine” (D. Semaška, p.63). This, combined with cyber-attacks and military drills, 
employing scenarios “of taking over the control of Lithuanian territory” (D. Semaška, p.67), 
19 
 
creates a sense that “the Baltics will be next” (D. Dobrāja, p.85). Hence, the Russian threat is 
“very real and not exaggeration” (D. Dobrāja, p.85). 
Subsequently, the Baltic states know that the “only thing Russia will respect is force” (D. 
Dobrāja, p.89), something the West ignored before Crimea. Therefore, the respondents reiterated 
that the only credible solution would be “to deploy [NATO] troops in the Baltics” (D. Semaška, 
p.73). Post-Crimea, Baltic “alarms concerning the threats from Russia (…) were finally 
believed” and troops were deployed (D. Dobrāja, p.85). The first “good step in a sequence of 
good steps” has been set (D. Semaška, p.72). 
Main Expectation: Discussion 
In sum, Russia is an existential threat to the “security of the Baltic states [and the] security of the 
entire NATO” alliance (Latvian Foreign Ministry, 2017). Therefore, “the only solution to the 
Russian threat [is] the presence of NATO troops on Baltic soil” (D. Dobrāja, p.85). Moreover, as 
is apparent from NATO’s discursive shift, the Baltic alarms which had gone unheard for so long 
were finally heeded (D. Dobrāja, p.85).  
At the Wales Summit “all the [Western] leaders agreed who is the aggressor in Europe 
today” (NATO, 2014b). Therefore, in response “to the challenges posed by Russia and their 
strategic implications,” the members “have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan” 
(NATO, 2014, p.2). Which includes “continuous air, land, and maritime presence (…) in the 
Eastern part of the alliance” (NATO, 2014a, p.2). Moreover, NATO has established “a Very 
High Readiness Joint Task Force,” which deploys troops and assets to the Baltics “on a rotational 
basis” (NATO, 2014a, p.2). Furthermore, after the Warsaw Summit, NATO decided to “further 
strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture” (NATO, 2016, p.10), by establishing 
“an enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland,” consisting of “four 
battalion-sized battlegroups, (…) present at all times in these countries” (NATO, 2016, p.11). 
The Baltic calls were finally heeded. As Ms. Dobrāja (p.) noted, “it was wise of NATO to 
commit troops,” the Baltics are “feeling much safer.”  
The central expectation assumed that the Baltics would employ the Crimean Crisis as a 
policy window to securitize Russia as a threat to NATO, proposing the deployment of troops to 
the Baltics as the only option to render the referent object – NATO – safe. The mainstream IR 
literature-based counter expectation held such a process as impossible, since small states cannot 
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compete with larger states in an area of politics where these larger state shave already asserted 
their interests, under any circumstances. Yet, as is clearly visible from the presented results, the 
Baltics have clearly managed to seize the Crimean policy window and influence NATO’s 
definitions and policies, since troops were deployed after the Crimean Crisis. The central 
expectation is confirmed. 
First Supportive Expectation: Asserting Authority 
Securitization has been confirmed. However, apart from recognizing and acting upon the right 
policy window, what arguments did the Baltics employ to this end? As mentioned by Ole Wæver 
(2000, p.252), the level of “social capital of the enunciator” determines the outcome. Therefore, 
to increase the chance of successful securitization, the Baltic states are expected to attempt to 
explicitly assert their authority as securitizing actors, through referencing national history, 
national experience in negotiating the identified threat, prior attempts at securitizing the 
identified threat, and through acting in concert with other like-minded states. 
First Supportive Expectation: Discourse Analysis 
Upon review, authority-based arguments are utilized rather sparingly. Most attempts at asserting 
Baltic authority focus either on the reasons for the failure of previous attempts at securitization 
or the common position of the Baltic states as securitizing actors. 
First, as Lithuanian president Grybauskaitė stated: “for [the West], it was a big surprise 
that a country, which we treated as a partner, acts beyond agreements, treaties and common 
values” (NATO, 2014b). The Baltics, however, were aware of “a disturbing pattern of [Russian] 
aggressive behavior that dates back at least to 2008” (Marmei, 2017, p.1). “We said [there] 
would be more [attacks] at that time. No one listened,” Lithuanian foreign minister Linkevičius 
stated (NATO Review, 2016). “For years [the Baltics] warned the west that Russia remained a 
threat” (Milne, 2017). But, “no one heard alarm” (Weymouth, 2014b). Regardless, the Baltics 
remained vigilant. 
As Estonian foreign minister Jürgen Ligi argued, “It seemed to have been [the] thinking 
in the nineties that it’s an end of history; that [the world] is going to live in democracy and 
peace.” Therefore, “many Western countries (…) forgot quickly what happened in Georgia” 
(Irvine, 2016) and “life continued” (Weymouth, 2017b). “The result is [that] Russia can do 
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anything, since NATO does not have the will, conviction, or even capacity to respond” (Wess 
Mitchell, 2015, p.2). “We [NATO] can’t allow ourselves to be surprised again (NATO, 2014b). 
Since the Baltics were not surprised, they knew and warned. Which grants them authority. 
Second, the Baltic states often emphasize either their own common position or 
partnership with regional partners. This often done with collective language, in which the Baltics 
reference the primacy of inter-Baltic cooperation (Kriščiūnas, 2017). Following Latvian foreign 
minister Edgar Rinkēvičs, “history has shown that the Baltic states cannot view their security in 
isolation from each other” (Latvian Foreign Ministry, 2016b). The Baltics must act “jointly and 
tenaciously” (Latvian Foreign Ministry, 2016a).  
Moreover, such cooperation also takes place of a regional level, mostly with Poland 
(Kriščiūnas, 2017). Latvian president Raimonds Vējonis “noted with satisfaction the significant 
contribution of Poland in strengthening security of the Baltic States and called for” ever-closer 
cooperation (Chancery of the President of Latvia, 2016). Moreover, the Baltic ambassadors to 
the United States, together with their Polish, Ukrainian, and Georgian colleagues, appeared 
before the US House of Representatives (Kriščiūnas, 2017; Marmei, 2017; Teikmanis, 2017; 
Wilczek, 2017) to discuss the Russian threat and secure US commitments as its solution. Since 
the Baltics stand united and speak with a common sense of urgency, at times joined by partners, 
they exhibit a level of authority felicitous to the success of their speech acts. 
Finally, at times the Baltics referenced their historical experiences, concluding that the 
West “cannot (…) quietly stand on the sidelines” (Baltic News Network, 2014). “Russia’s recent 
aggressive actions towards its neighbors bring back memories of when the Soviet Union 
invaded” the Baltics (NATO Review, 2014). As president Grybauskaitė emphasized, “we know 
how unpredictable our neighborhood is, how dangerous it is” (Zakaria, 2016). From such 
idiosyncratic histories, the Baltics derive an exclusive authority, upon which they can build as 
securitizing actors. 
First Supportive Expectation: Interviews 
During the interviews, the respondents were asked which strategies their states employed to 
render securitization successful. Only one respondent answered this question directly. Yet, from 
the overall narrative, an indication of such strategies can be derived. Moreover, the interviews 
confirmed that explicit statements of authority were only sparsely used. 
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 The authority-based strategy which was explicitly referenced in the interviews, was that 
of a “consistent cooperation and show of positions” between the Baltics and their partners (D. 
Dobrāja, p.88). For the Baltics, coordinating NATO presence and securing troop deployments is 
“the major [expression of] trilateral cooperation” (D. Semaška, p.77). Yet, the Baltics, are 
“definitely not alone” in this endeavor (M. Murd, p.51). Their primary partner in this specific 
process of securitization is Poland, who shares their threat definitions (M. Murd, p.51; D. 
Dobrāja, p.88). A “constant and united position” between these partners, expressed in every 
forum of interaction, is the key to success (D. Dobrāja, p.88).  
 Second, the authority required for successful securitization was also implicitly, but 
clearly, asserted through references to previous attempts at securitizing Russia. The Baltics 
“recognized this [Russian] pattern” immediately (D. Dobrāja, p.87). Their experience with 
Russia, bestows upon them a level of authority felicitous to success. As Ms. Dobrāja (p.87) 
notes, the Baltics became de facto Russia-experts, since “the West was too naïve” and distracted. 
Hence, “the main task of [Baltic] foreign policy (…) is to reveal to the international public (…) 
the lessons of previous incidents and what they mean for Baltic and Western security” (D. 
Dobrāja, p.84). While the West was blinded, the Baltics remained watchful. 
Finally, the Baltics face constant Russian “harassment” and “meddling” (D. Semaška, 
p.82). Additionally, such activities “very much” remind of Soviet terror (D. Dobrāja, p.86; D. 
Semaška, p.64). The Baltics “still remember the Soviet time and also know from history how the 
Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union (…) it was totally unacceptable” (M. Murd, 
p.47). The fact that such occupations have returned to the very fore of international politics is 
equally unacceptable. The Baltics know, from experience. Hence their level of authority and the 
consequent success of securitization. 
First Supportive Expectation: Discussion 
As briefly mentioned above, authority-based arguments are utilized only sparingly by the Baltics. 
When employed, they are generally used to argue the fallacy of NATO’s pre-Crimea discourse 
and to grant authority to the Baltic alternative, with the latter capable of explaining the events 
that relegated the former to “a state of shock” (Weymouth, 2014b). It is this implicit ‘I told you 
so’ that bestows authority upon the Baltics as securitizing actors and validity upon their threat 
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definitions. Yet, when such arguments are employed, this is done in a nuanced and constructive 
manner, which does not dwell on the past, but provides a strategy for the future. 
The reason for such reluctance has been identified by Mr. Semaška (p.74) during the 
interview. By his account, “if you rush to boast or to take the credit for something, the next time, 
your ability to achieve something will be minimized.” Since, NATO is the locus of Baltic 
national security (D. Semaška, p.66), it does not serve Baltic interests to antagonize NATO 
through smugness and feelings of superiority. The Baltics emphasize the importance of 
collectivity and mutual support, as is expected of small states (East, 1973). Hence, even as 
securitizing actors, the Baltics see themselves as simple parts of a larger collective. Leading parts 
deserving of support, yes; but parts nonetheless. 
Based on these conclusions, the first supportive expectation that the Baltics will seek to 
explicitly assert their authority over their audience, can be judged. While it is true that such 
authority-establishing arguments were used, they were not employed as strongly as Wæver 
(2000) suggested. Thus, the first supportive expectation is confirmed, although some 
qualification is required.  
Second Supportive Expectation: Audience Attention 
Consequently, successful securitization must have been enabled through different discursive 
urgings. Thierry Balzacq (2005), expects such arguments to be audience-dependent. Then, to 
increase the chance of successful securitization, the Baltic states are expected to attempt to coopt 
their audience, by referencing those shared and foundational values, held commitments, and 
domestic policy changes relevant to their audience. 
Second Supportive Expectation: Discourse Analysis 
During the process of securitization, the Baltics often employed audience-based arguments, 
defining the identified threat vis-à-vis the very foundations upon which the audience is built: 
Russia threatens “the core values of democracy, human rights, (…) the rule of law” (Marmei, 
2017, p.1), “sovereignty, independence, and national integrity” (Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, 
2016c). Therefore, according to Latvian under-secretary of state Andris Pelšs (2017, Appendix 
E, p.93), “Russia’s actions in Ukraine are a blatant violation of international law.” 
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Consequently, Russia causes “international tension and threatens world peace” 
(Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, 2017a). Therefore, Estonian foreign minister Sven Mikser argues 
that “it is important to strengthen NATO deterrence capabilities” (Estonian Foreign Ministry, 
2016). Since, the Russian threatens not just the Baltic states, but “the entire post-World War II 
order, which is under question” (Weymouth, 2014b). Here, the Baltics transform the Russian 
threat from a mere observation into an ideological menace, which seeks “to destroy the [entire] 
Western security model” (Weymouth, 2017b). NATO’s very core is at risk, necessitating alliance 
action. 
Second, the Baltics aim to define themselves as integral parts of the NATO framework. 
This is done through mentioning the Baltic contributions to the audience and the arguing of 
subsequent reciprocity. As Estonian president Kaljulaid argues, “We have fought [with NATO] 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have contributed” (Weymouth, 2017b). Furthermore, “Since 2003, 
Latvian troops have stood shoulder to shoulder with [NATO and] the U.S. (…) We both have 
made sacrifices” (Teikmanis, 2017, p.1). “Latvia’s contribution (…) is the Riga-based NATO 
Centre of Excellence for Strategic Communications” (Latvian Foreign Ministry, 2016a). 
Combined with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia and the 
NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence in Lithuania. “The Baltic states do have the will,” 
and contribute as much as they can,” but “they are not in a position to [carry all] defense 
capabilities by themselves” (Kriščiūnas, 2017). Mutual support is the key. 
Third, ever since the Wales Summit, both NATO and the US have attempted to convince 
members to increase their defense budgets. The Baltics “take seriously [their] commitment to 
[collective] defense and defense spending, an area where many [other] European countries (…) 
should do more,” Lithuanian foreign minister Linkevičius argued (Shapiro & Thoburn, 2015). 
However, the Baltic and “Lithuanian commitment to allocate 2 per cent of its GDP to defense is 
firm” (Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, 2017b). Latvia, too, recognizes its “primary duty to invest in 
(…) security” and aims to aims to spend “2% of GDP” on defense by 2020 (Latvian Foreign 
Ministry, 2015). Moreover, Estonian foreign minister Keit Pentus-Rosimannus, affirms that 
Estonia “contributes 2% of its GDP to defense spending and this principle will continue in the 
future” (Estonian Foreign Ministry, 2014). The Baltics lead by example, which legitimizes their 
requests for support as instances of fair reciprocity. 
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Second Supportive Expectation: Interviews 
 The interviews yield a similar view. First, “the emphasizing on common values and 
ideologies” between the Baltic securitizing actors and NATO as its audience is paramount (D. 
Dobrāja, p.88). By defining “what happened in Ukraine” and Crimea as wholly destructive of 
“universal values, (…) international law, and the system of international relations and 
agreements as we know it” (M. Murd, p.39), the Baltics both define themselves as virtuous parts 
of the value-based Western system and render the identified Russian threat upon them as 
existential for the entire collective. Moreover, due to a Soviet “glorification [being] led by the 
Kremlin” (D. Semaška, p.56), Russia’s actions become ideologically charged and challenge the 
audience’s very foundations. 
Second, since the audience in question is based on the value of collectivity, it is important 
to highlight the Baltic commitments towards this audience, to generate a sense of reciprocity. 
One such factor is the “increase of [Baltic] defense spending” (D. Semaška, p.68). For Lithuania, 
“defense spending, (…) almost tripled over the past six years” (D. Semaška, p.76). Moreover, 
Latvia, also, plans “a defense budget of 2% of its GDP, a target which will most likely be met 
next year” (D. Dobrāja, p.86). “Estonia [too] has already for a number of years been spending 
close to two percent” (D. Semaška, p.77).  
Moreover, the Baltics have dedicated their entire military structure to support. “With 
these limited [budgetary] resources,” between 2003 and 2011, Lithuania nonetheless dedicated 
“that money [to] something that is needed for NATO, so we, in spite of organizing total defense 
of the country, we downscaled to well-prepared, small units, that perform certain niche functions 
for NATO operations abroad” (D. Semaška, p.66). The same was emphasized by Ms. Dobrāja 
and Mr. Murd. Thus, the Baltics are aware that “if our contribution is needed, we have to [be 
able to] provide it” (M. Murd, p.52). The Baltics are one for all, allowing them to emphasize all 
for one. 
Second Supportive Expectation: Discussion 
Hence, it is clear that the Baltic states favored strategic audience-based arguments above blatant 
displays of relative authority. Moreover, by coopting the audience’s own values and narratives, 
rather than imposing definitions, the Baltics could render a threat previously thought as exclusive 
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to “a country far, far away” (M. Murd, p.50) as commanding immediate audience attention. 
Thierry Balzacq (2005, p.3) was correct about the “centrality of [the] audience.”  
However, such conclusions do not compromise the level of authority invested in the 
Baltic states. On the contrary, in the present case the Baltics have attempted and managed to 
blend such arguments of authority into value-laden references geared towards the context of the 
audience. Authority, therefore, was expressed in such a way that the audience did not perceive it 
as such. Hence, it is important to recognize that the “social capital of the enunciator” (Wæver, 
2000, p.252) is context-dependent and not capacity-bound, as is generally assumed in IR.  
It is here that the second supportive assumption must be judged. Based on the results 
from the discourse analysis and the conducted interviews, the Baltic states did indeed employed 
audience-dependent arguments. Moreover, as opposed to explicit arguments of authority, the 
former has taken center-stage. Hence, the second supportive expectation has been affirmed. 
Based on the judgments rendered vis-à-vis the two supportive conclusions, the concepts 
of authority and audience should be conceptualized side by side. As argued above, the Baltics 
framed their authority not in explicit terms, but in such language acceptable to their audience, 
blurring the lines between these two dimensions. Then, it is imperative to recognize that 
conceptions of authority are not objective, but context-dependent. Therefore, they must be 
interpreted as intersubjective constructions, idiosyncratic to the case under review, along which 
interactions and reality evolve. 
Conclusion 
This thesis posed the following question: What strategy could afford the small Baltic states 
influence over and the ability to secure concrete military commitments from NATO, to enhance 
their level of national security in the wake of the Crimean Crisis? Following an extensive review 
of the relevant literature, this thesis expected that the theory of securitization, with the Crimean 
Crisis as its policy window, would provide the small Baltic states with the appropriate directions 
upon which influence over NATO could be established, troop commitments could be secured, 
and their geopolitically induced vulnerability could be addressed. 
By way of process-tracing, it was concluded that the required grounds for the expected 
securitization were present. Consequently, by juxtaposing the results from both a discourse 
analysis and face-to-face interviews, this expectation was tested. The data collected confirmed 
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that, by rendering the threat experienced by the Baltics existential for NATO itself, securitization 
indeed afforded the small Baltic states the ability to compel NATO to complete an action it 
refused to undertake before the Crimean Crisis (Kojala & Keršanskas, 2015; Rostoks & Vanaga, 
2016). 
Moreover, it was expected that this securitization would be facilitated along a harmony 
between arguments respectively rooted in Baltic authority and the context of the audience. First, 
the Baltics only sparingly exerted their authority, using such arguments mainly to delegitimize 
NATO’s pre-Crimean discourse of constructive engagement and to refer to the common Baltic 
positions. Consequently, the Baltics relied heavily on audience-specific arguments, such as 
references to shared values, Baltic commitments to the audience, and specific domestic changes 
implemented for the good of the audience. It is by virtue of such audience-sensitive arguments, 
in combination with the right policy window, that Baltic influence over NATO was established 
and the main expectation was validated. However, since the arguments still command some 
degree of authority, albeit context-sensitive, in future research, such definitions should be 
merged. 
The significance of this thesis lies in the juxtapositions of its conclusions to the wider 
body of scholarly literature within which they exist. As noted in the literature review above, the 
mainstream theories in IR and even norm entrepreneurship, to varying degrees and lengths 
assume that small states are bereft of agency within the international state system, leaving them 
powerless vis-à-vis their larger counterparts and incapable of accessing the policy areas occupied 
by such larger powers, such as high politics. Consequently, resilience, was not based on the 
equal engagement between different entities, but as the successful avoidance of confrontation 
and the colonization of niche policy areas. 
Such assumptions of perpetual small state vulnerability that have been challenged by the 
results of this thesis. The present case affirms that small states, given the right context, are not 
only capable of engaging with larger states on an equal basis, but are capable of exerting 
influence over such larger states. Moreover, such influence was not only established in a sphere 
of international politics held as the exclusive domain of large powers, namely the high politics 
“of war and peace” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p.179), but it was the small Baltics states that 
coaxed NATO back to its military roots and subsequently changed the entire Western Post-Cold 
War security order. 
28 
 
Furthermore, it is in this simultaneous discursive and objective influence, as a 
fundamental deviance from conventional IR thought, that small state resilience is truly defined. 
Consequently, securitization grants not only the key to Baltic resilience, but given the right 
context, it provides a universal strategy for small state resilience in all the “different sectors of 
security” (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p.93), even high politics, which IR literature 
expected to be wholly impossible. Through securitization, capacity-bound definitions of size and 
influence are dismissed.  
Hence, to understand dynamics of state size and influence, securitization, as opposed to 
norm entrepreneurship, should be adopted as the main strategy of resilience in small state 
literature. Since, the latter regards resilience as a quirk, rather than a trend. Moreover, the 
discussion this thesis generates should be supported through future research, geared towards the 
analysis of deviance from those impossibilities central to IR. Without chronicling the exceptions 
to the rule, the rule and its discipline are void. This thesis has shown the way. 
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Location: The Hague, the Netherlands. 
Before the start of the recording, the interviewer (Mr. Bob Martin van Eijk) thanked Mr. Murd 
for his willingness to participate in this interview. Also, the premise of the research was 
explained and a definition of small states was provided and discussed. It is here that the 
transcript begins. 
START OF THE TRANSCRIPT 
Mr. Murd: Ehm, well. Maybe, I will start with the definition you mentioned, or the different 
definitions. And I am not quite sure that nowadays the world is working according to these 
classical theories or classical definitions. And, just to give an example of the European Union, 
but of course I am quite sure that the same applies to the NATO. The European Union and the 
NATO actually are maybe not so much interest-based organizations or unions. Of course, there 
are always interests, but which is even more important – particularly important for the smaller 
countries – is that the rules of these organizations are value-based. And talking about values, or 
common values, and here in Europe or in the Western world of course we have common 
values… 
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely. 
Mr. Murd: …It’s talking about common values. It’s, by my personal understanding, not so 
important anymore how big or small is a country, because we have universal values. 
Mr. van Eijk: We share them. 
Mr. Murd: But ehm… 
Mr. van Eijk: Could you give an example of such values? 
Mr. Murd: Ehm. Well, ehm. All basic values of the European Union, democracy, rule of law, 
human rights… 
Mr. van Eijk: Would you say sovereignty? 
Mr. Murd: Ehm. Yes, definitely. And of course, particularly the rule of law and principal 
(inaudible) you know that this is the basis of Western culture and our values. And of course, 
what happened in Ukraine back in 2014; what happened with Crimea, it was very clear, actually. 
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Mr. van Eijk: Would you say entirely opposed to our values? 
Mr. Murd: Against, ehm. Yes, not only against an independent country – I mean Ukraine – but 
also against universal values, against international law, and the system of international relations 
and agreements as we know it. 
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely. 
Mr. Murd: And, of course, I think that the reaction of the Western countries and the 
organizations like the European Union, like the NATO, it was not because of the Baltic states. 
But it was really about values and understanding that, actually, breaking international treaties, 
breaking international law, it happened just a thousand kilometers from Brussels. Well, just a 
little bit more. But actually, geographically, Kiev – as the capital of Ukraine – is closer to 
Brussels than some parts of the current European Union. 
Mr. van Eijk: Aha. Okay. 
Mr. Murd: So, it happened very, very close to our borders, to our cultural space. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yeah. Would you say that it was some kind of wake-up call for the Western world. 
Mr. Murd: Definitely. Or maybe not so much… Yes, it was a wake-up call in that sense that, 
actually, there were talks about all these things. And, actually, what happened in 2008 in Georgia 
had to be a wake-up call. But… 
Mr. van Eijk: But it was not? 
Mr. Murd: But, for some reason it was not. But what happened in Ukraine. Yes, I think it was a 
wake-up call in that sense that some countries and some politicians, whose priority was to keep 
relations with Russia in the best place, even giving away some values; I think that they 
understand that enough is enough. 
Mr. van Eijk: Enough is enough? Yeah. 
Mr. Murd: That there are red lines that were crossed.  
Mr. van Eijk: Would you then say that the actions undertaken by, let’s name it, the Russian 
Federation, are principally a threat to our Western values and our Western order, if we might 
term it that way? 
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Mr. Murd: Yes, definitely. Because, it’s what, again, what happened in Crimea and what happens 
in Eastern Ukraine today is totally against Western values and our understanding of international 
relations, and it’s definitely against the sovereignty of the state. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yeah, absolutely. 
Mr. Murd: And, yes, I… I am quite sure that this was a red line for the European countries or the 
Western countries in general.  
Mr. van Eijk: Good, then we have established that. Then, sir, may I direct us back to, well for 
now… 
Mr. Murd: Yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: …To Estonia itself. We have already talked a bit about the values that, well 
basically, underpin the Estonian democracy, the Dutch democracy, and well the entire Western 
international order. But after independence, I believe it was 1991, if I am correct? For Estonia, 
formal independence? 
Mr. Murd: Regaining independence, yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes, regaining formal independence. Could you give a short description of the 
main threats and challenges that Estonia faced at that moment; at that specific moment in time? 
Mr. Murd: Back in 1991? 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes, back in 1991, when you regained your sovereignty from the USSR. 
Mr. Murd: Well, the main issue at that time, of course, was building up the state from scratches; 
building up state institutions, including defense forces, of course; adopting a legal system 
according to the rule of law; and I think that, at that time, this was the main task. And definitely, 
the main threat was just not being able to do this, and to became a failed country. As we have 
seen in some cases around the world. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes, yes, we have. 
Mr. Murd: And, yes, building up your country according to the rule of law was the main issue. 
And, well, there were a lot of threats, not just external but also internal. Because, again in the 
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case of some other countries, we have seen the rise of corruption and that kind of things, which is 
definitely very serious things and which are real threats. Not external, but internal. 
Mr. van Eijk: Internal, yes. 
Mr. Murd: So, I think that at the beginning of the nineties, that was the main task. Also, the 
restoring of the economy, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a very integrated 
economic system. Of course, this system was not based on the market, but on just some decisions 
by central institutions. And there were also very illogical supply chains, for example: some big 
industries, producing some things which were usable only by one other big industry, located 
totally somewhere else. And of course, of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the 
Soviet economy – the planning economy – actually, that kind of things. And yes, actually, a lot 
of big Soviet-time industries collapsed. So, an urgent issue was to find new markets; to make 
new economic connections. And it was a logical point of geopolitical choice: if we want to 
belong to Europe or if we want to stay in the sphere of influence of, well, the former Soviet 
Union, let me say it this way. And at that time, there was a clear political will to be integrated 
into Europe. 
Mr. van Eijk: May I ask what animated that decision? Especially, since, if I am correct, and you 
may correct me if I am wrong here, but Estonia has a rather large ethnic Russian minority, if I 
am correct. 
Mr. Murd: Maybe not so large. 
Mr. van Eijk: Not so large? 
Mr. Murd: But, yes, still. And of course, if we are talking about the Russian minority, we… 
Actually, there are different Russian minorities, Russians, Russian-speaking populations, 
whatever, all these terms may mean very different things, depending on the context. If we are 
talking about… usually, we use, or when people are talking about the Russian minority, they use 
just one general term and taking this group of people, a part of the population, as a unanimous 
group. Actually, it is not. Yes. Estonia has had a Russian minority for a very long time. During 
the independence period of 1918-1940, we also had an ethnic Russian minority. It’s a historical 
fact. At the same time, all these people who moved to Estonia during the Soviet time or in some 
cases, when I am talking about big industries, which were established during Soviet-times and 
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which were integrated with some other big industries and actually were not integrated with the 
local industries at all, for that kind of industries also workers were brought in from other parts of 
the Soviet Union, at that time. 
Mr. van Eijk: Would you then say that over time these, let me then call it the Russian minority, 
even though you just said that it is not a unanimous group, has always remained a bit of a 
separate sphere within Estonian society, even during the process of regaining independence and 
your choice to approach the West? 
Mr. Murd: Yes and no, because it depends on what part or segment of this Russian population 
you are looking at. There are very well integrated people and who were already at the end of the 
eighties and the beginning of the nineties who were part of independence movements and so on: 
ethnic Russians totally pro-Estonian independence and so one, already during the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay. 
Mr. Murd: At the same time, yes. During Soviet times, most industrialized parts of Estonia – the 
East of Estonia – these are parts where lot of Russians were brought from other parts of the 
Soviet Union. Actually, I am also from that part of Estonia. And it happened already during 
Soviet times that Estonians became a minority in that part. And if we’re talking about Russians 
in Estonia today, we have approximately one quarter of our population as, well, again it’s very 
slippery as to how to put this, people of Russian origin – ethnical origin – or origin of some other 
nationality of the former Soviet Union. Most of them are very well integrated. In the north-east 
of Estonia, in cities, some cities, they are not so well integrated. What I mean by this is that they 
live in a different information space. Because, nowadays, they can watch Russian TV-channels, 
so they mainly get their information from Russian channels and not Russian-language channels 
in Estonia. But… 
Mr. van Eijk: But actual Russian TV-broadcasters? 
Mr. Murd: Yes, and of course at the moment in Russia there are very few independent tv-stations 
and of course they don’t have any option to be something else than just local. A lot of people are 
just looking at Russian state-owned channels or channels even if they are not state-owned, they 
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are still fully under control of the Russian authorities. Like, well, you maybe know, maybe not, 
that the gas company Gazprom… 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes? 
Mr. Murd: …Is actually one the largest media companies in Russia? 
Mr. van Eijk: Is it? Okay, that I did not know. 
Mr. Murd: Yes, say, well, after the Putin-era started ten, fifteen years ago, actually, all 
independent, big independent tv-corporations were taken over by oligarchs or big companies. 
Including Gazprom, which owns, it’s not only one channel, but a chain of different, a group of 
channels called NTV. In Russia, this is very ironical, because originally this NTV means 
independent television. But okay, let’s return to Estonia. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes. 
Mr. Murd: Well. So, the problem is that there are still people, not even a majority of this so-
called Russian group – ethnic minority – there are still people who get all their information from 
Russian state-controlled media outlets, tv-channels. That’s a problem. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes. 
Mr. Murd: But of course, if we’re talking about values it’s, it’s a very principal question: should 
we shut down these channels in Estonia or not? 
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely, that is a dilemma. 
Mr. Murd: Because, it… Media freedom is also… 
Mr. van Eijk: One of our essential values. 
Mr. Murd: One of our fundamental values, exactly.  
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely. 
Mr. Murd: So far, Estonia has decided that, notwithstanding the fact that these Russian tv-
channels provide very, very propagandistic views and, well, if they talk about what happens in 
Ukraine, it’s amazing how different the stories… 
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Mr. van Eijk: Entirely different? 
Mr. Murd: …They tell are from the western norms. But, anyway, it’s media freedom. 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay. That’s very grand of you, let me put that first. It’s, according to our values, 
that is beautiful. However, like you said, it does, well, to some extent afford Russia at least, well, 
some backdoor I’d say into… 
Mr. Murd: Yes, but of course I know that also some EU-member states have taken steps against 
Russian channels. But, well, it’s very slippery. Because, well, today, yes, Russian propaganda, 
everybody agrees with this, tomorrow it may be something else. It’s, well, media freedom is a 
very important thing, and therefore, I think that it is more important to just, to just provide facts 
and provide information and just to fight this propaganda. 
Mr. van Eijk: So, be the better man, essentially? 
Mr. Murd: Also, actually, there is a kind of stratcom approach in the European Union, nowadays. 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay. Right, then if I may? I have had a look at, well an extensive look I might 
say, at the website of for instance your embassy here in the Netherlands, I have reviewed the 
website of your foreign ministry, and whenever I take a look at for instance your national 
security concept, what comes forward very clearly and is even stated in the very first, one of the 
very first sentences on the website of your embassy here is that international security is 
indivisible from your own security. 
Mr. Murd: Exactly. 
Mr. van Eijk: Does that then mean that the solution to your national security dilemmas, such as 
for instance the Russian, well, propaganda that you identified, via those TV-channels, that the 
solution to that and threats along those lines lies on the international level as well? 
Mr. Murd: Yes, definitely. 
Mr. van Eijk: Through for instance cooperation on the basis of shared values? 
Mr. Murd: Definitely, yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: And to what extent, well, at least in the scholarly articles I have read on the 
Estonian security situation, NATO has always been presented as the locus of your, especially 
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your more realistically oriented security concepts. Is NATO, can we put it like this: is NATO 
essential to your military security?  
Mr. Murd: Well, it’s… 
Mr. van Eijk: Since you have said that after independence you have been building up your own 
military structures. 
Mr. Murd: It’s part of our military security. Well, actually, we are not only on the receiving side, 
but also... 
Mr. van Eijk: Of course, you contribute lots to international missions. 
Mr. Murd: …Every NATO-partner should contribute. 
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely. 
Mr. Murd: And we are taking our obligations seriously. When there was a NATO operation in 
Afghanistan, Estonia was a part of it. We have participated in several other missions, which are 
not officially maybe NATO operations, but still together with our NATO allies. And yes, 
actually, the meaning of NATO is that NATO or all NATO-partners should provide, say, 
assistance, and at the same time there is no free-riding just to get it, you have to contribute from 
your side. Actually, Estonia is one of the few countries who actually fulfills the two-percent of 
GDP obligation at the moment. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes, I have read about that. That is good, absolutely. To, then, sum up all of this, 
can we, then, describe in the broadest sense possible your national security strategy, for instance, 
as “balancing the East by engaging the West?” Would that be a way to describe the general view 
that underpins Estonian security policy? 
Mr. Murd: Again, maybe it is not so much East versus West, but it is about international security 
overall. If we are talking about terror threats, I think that the geographical location, actually, it is 
not important anymore. Because we have the same threats, all countries here in Europe. 
Mr. van Eijk: But from a military perspective? And in a more traditional sense, let’s say for 
instance, at the outset of your regaining of independence, would this be correct, or at least more 
correct? 
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Mr. Murd: To some extent, yes definitely. But, of course, even nowadays, the meaning of a 
military threat is slightly different than what we had some decades ago. Because, we have a lot 
of new threats. I already mentioned terrorism, we have cyber security… 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes, I believe Estonia takes the lead on cyber security for NATO, does it not? 
Mr. Murd: Yes, we are taking it very seriously. And also, this NATO Centre of Cyber Security, 
of Excellence, is located in Estonia. 
Mr. van Eijk: That is great. 
Mr. Murd: And yes, definitely, I think this is our segment, where our geographical size doesn’t 
matter… 
Mr. van Eijk: It matters least? 
Mr. Murd: …And well, of course it is actually very funny, or very interesting if we are talking 
about the size of the territory, Estonia is the same size as the Netherlands, more or less. But, of 
course, it is seventeen point one million versus one point three million, if we are talking about 
population. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yeah, that’s why size definitions are always disputed at best. Right, then, we have 
considered that. And the, if I may, direct our attention for a moment to the Crimean Crisis itself, 
back in 2014. What was the overall domestic political and societal response to the Russian so-
called annexation of Crimea? How did Estonia respond to this? 
Mr. Murd: As I said, it’s against international law. It was breaking the obligations which Russia 
took back in the beginning of the nineties, when Ukraine gave away their nuclear weapons. 
Mr. van Eijk: The Minsk Agreements, if I’m correct? 
Mr. Murd: I’m not sure, it’s probably… Well… No, it was, maybe I am wrong at the moment, 
but probably the Budapest agreements? 
Mr. van Eijk: That might also be true. 
Mr. Murd: Yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: Many agreements. 
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Mr. Murd: Well, and, of course, most Estonians still remember the Soviet time and also know 
from history how the Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union back in 1940. And, 
therefore, it was totally unacceptable for Estonian society, broadly, and also for the Estonian 
politicians. Of course, there was a group of people who live in this Russian information room… 
Mr. van Eijk: The Russian bubble. 
Mr. Murd: …And yes, they of course had a different view about this. 
Mr. van Eijk: And this did not cause any societal instability? 
Mr. Murd: No, definitely not. Well, I bet you that you still can find very different views on this 
issue in Estonia. But definitely not any kind of social instability or anything. 
Mr. van Eijk: Would you say that the Crimean Crisis as such made the regular Estonian feel less 
secure, within the existing order? Since it, apparently, could be breached. Did it have any 
profound influence on domestic threat perceptions? Even in the broadest sense? 
Mr. Murd: Well, let me put it this way… 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay. 
Mr. Murd: That, overall, security and stability have decreased after 9/11 and since then, I think 
that the world globally, or at least, the way we see the world around us, is less secure. And, if I 
mentioned, or if we discuss what happened in Crimea as a wake-up call for the West, actually, 
this was something we were aware of a long, long time before that. Even before what happened 
in Georgia, starting with the Chechen wars and that kind of things. So, I don’t think that it 
changed so much our security assessment, but of course it was one addition thing, one additional 
factor to take into account. So, definitely, I think that security perceptions nowadays are less than 
some twenty years ago, but it is not only because of Crimea, but because of all the things that are 
happening around us. And, again, I think that terrorist threats are very serious threats also right 
now, also against Estonian citizens who have been killed in recent attacks in Europe. So, it is 
impossible to say that, or incorrect to say that this is because of Crimea, but overall, we have a 
very different local security situation at the moment. 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay, then, since you said that Estonians, and probably the Baltic states in general, 
were not surprised as such to see the events in Crimea transpire, if I understood you correctly… 
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Mr. Murd: Well, let me clarify… 
Mr. van Eijk: Please. 
Mr. Murd: Definitely, at least, well, if I am talking from my personal perspective, and actually I 
served at that time at our embassy in Kiev, in Ukraine, so I was very close to all the things that 
happened. But, I think that nobody expected something like this would happen, so definitely, it 
was a surprise for everybody. But, yes, taking into account particularly the Georgian wars, but 
also the Chechen wars and all what happened before, actually, it was not surprising that 
something happened. But of course, the scope of this, that kind of thing, that military personnel 
without any signs that they belong to the military, just taking over part of the country and after 
that just the formal, and again breaking all international law, rules, annexation of Crimea, of 
course, that was surprising. But of course, I am quite sure that if we are talking about different 
crises or conflicts, no conflict or crisis repeats, it is always different. It may be a classic military 
operation; it may be something related to cyber security, cyber-attacks. Nowadays, we are 
talking about hybrid threats, not about single threats.  
Mr. van Eijk: But, then, still, especially when we compare this to the wider sense that at least the 
West held, at least to some extent, especially, well, most concretely visible in response to the 
Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Well, the West itself, and I think I’m quoting Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe Philip Breedlove here, that the Russo-Georgian War was perceived as a 
“one-off, isolated incident,” their perspective. Yet, if I am not mistaken, and based on all of what 
we just discussed, you did not share that view. At least essentially. 
Mr. Murd: No, not really. Yes. We can see the pattern here. 
Mr. van Eijk: What was your, at least at the time, your response to the Russo-Georgian War. 
Since, I have read reports that the Baltic states and, I believe, some other Central and Eastern 
European NATO-allies petitioned NATO, or at least attempted to wake up NATO that something 
had to be done. 
Mr. Murd: Yes. 
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Mr. van Eijk: That the Eastern border, at least to some extent, had to be secured. Since, 
apparently, it was no longer secure. What is your take on that? How did your state respond to this 
difference in discourse? 
Mr. Murd: Yes, that is correct what you said. I don’t know what I can add to this. 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay, it is good to know that I am right on this very instance. Did you, and, well, 
maybe this is classified, but did you actively petition or request further, well, concrete support or 
military assistance, or personnel, or troops, or materiel, from NATO in response to the 2008 
crisis? Was there at least a request made? 
Mr. Murd: Maybe not directly related to the 2008 crisis, but I think that a very good example is 
that of air policing by NATO-allies. Which started already, I cannot recall the exact date at the 
moment, but what is a long story, in the beginning this air mission – air policing – was located 
only in Lithuania. Right, now there are two locations: one in Lithuania, one in Estonia. 
Mr. van Eijk: And I believe that mission was moved to a permanent basis at the 2012 Chicago 
summit, if I am not mistaken? 
Mr. Murd: Yes, yes. Which is of course a very important for us. This is something where we felt 
and still feel the NATO solidarity and the importance of NATO. But also, more recently, yes, we 
have also recently received some additional military forces from our NATO-allies stationed in 
Estonia. 
Mr. van Eijk: The Very High Readiness Task Force, if I am not mistaken… I think it was called. 
Too many technical terms, I am trying to remember… 
Mr. Murd: Yes, I agree, very difficult things. I know that some Dutch troops were recently 
relocated to Lithuania, together with some other countries. 
Mr. van Eijk: I have read reports of that, yes. But I believe that was the interim spearhead 
mission, if I am not mistaken. Before the Very High Readiness Task Force was deployed last 
year. 
Mr. Murd: We had similar troops from, I think, Denmark in Estonia. So… This definitely was 
the outcome of the Ukrainian Crisis. 
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Mr. van Eijk: Then, still, when we consider all of this, one striking difference remained. The fact 
that after the 2008 crisis, if we can call it that, this was entirely dismissed. Unfortunately, yes, 
this was entirely dismissed. Well later, then, I believe it was Lithuania, that led to way to a 
permanent Baltic air policing mission in the 2012 Chicago summit. And yet, after 2014 and 
subsequently again in 2016, at the Warsaw summit, NATO did recognize the threat in question… 
Mr. Murd: Right. 
Mr. van Eijk: ...And did actually react and send troops and materiel and established, I think, new 
permanent bases. What do you think facilitated this difference in response? Since there is a very 
clear difference in discourse apparent between 2008 and now, or at least three years ago in 2014. 
Do you have any sense of why this would be the case? What made the difference? 
Mr. Murd: Well, I think we already discussed this. I think that we may like it or not, but this is 
also about geographical distance. Because, Georgia or other Eastern European events or other 
Eastern European politicians, are in a country far, far away. Ukraine is almost, if we’re talking 
about Europe geographically, Ukraine is located in the middle of Europe. And, suddenly it was a 
different situation and technically, this is probably why Ukraine became the red line for the 
European Union and the NATO. Well, this is my understanding about this. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes, let me then see… Yes, this, mainly concerns, the actual… 
Mr. Murd: Yes, well, I am sorry to interrupt, but I can spare a maximum of ten more minutes.  
Mr. van Eijk: Okay, I’ll keep that in mind, but thank you very much. So, what I am going to ask 
now, and you might not have an answer to this, since this is more, like, focused on NATO itself 
and the interactions within it. But is seems, and I’ll build forward on what we’ve discussed so 
far, due to this difference in discourse between these two years, it seems as if NATO had to be 
convinced in some sense to respond the Crimean Crisis. And, usually, when something like this 
happens, and I am building now on academic literature, so this might as well be hocus-pocus, but 
usually when there is a discourse, let’s just say that the discourse, I think they called it positive 
engagement or something, under 2008, by some accounts people claimed that it was discredited 
by the fact that 2008 was not a one-off incident, a one-off isolated incident, but then 2014 
happened and there was a new problem. So apparently, the discourse of positive engagement did 
not work. In such a situation, what usually happens, as per the literature then, there is a sort of 
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vacuum created, since the discourse that NATO and most Western allies adopted was apparently 
no longer adequate. So, an alternative had to be introduced. And then, when we look at the Baltic 
states, for instance, and what we’ve talked about in the sense that you, ever since the Chechen 
wars, and especially following 2008, you had a certain sense and a certain expectation, if I may 
term it that way, regarding these incidents, and you have always expressed an alternative to this 
broader Western narrative. So, on the one hand, you had an alternative discourse available, on 
the other hand, you had both the incentive and the opportunity to champion this alternative and 
change NATO’s discourse. Would you say that, you played such a role; that Estonia, for 
instance, was a pivotal part of this change towards a different discourse and away from the 
discourse of positive engagement that we saw before this? Since, you’ve… Well, values are very 
important, international cooperation, international law, and that is precisely what this response 
was built upon. Would you say that this was the case? 
Mr. Murd: I think… I think that probably, yes, we definitely were a part of it, but definitely not 
alone. I think that there were quite a number of countries who shared this view and this 
understanding. 
Mr. van Eijk: Could you name a few? 
Mr. Murd: I… 
Mr. van Eijk: To get a sense… 
Mr. Murd: I think that, definitely, the Baltic countries, Poland of course, but not only… I think 
that also the United Kingdom played a quite important role. I am not really… 
Mr. van Eijk: No, of course… 
Mr. Murd: …So familiar with all these things that went on in the context of NATO. This looks 
that way for me. 
Mr. van Eijk: Of course. Yes, absolutely. And then, let me just see here, could you maybe, like 
you said you don’t really have the exact sense of how this all transpired, neither have I, so could 
you, apart from emphasizing shared values and the rule of law, was there another, maybe, 
strategy that you employed in order to get this through? Because you said that you, well, the 
Baltic states and Poland were cooperating on this. 
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Mr. Murd: I’m really not familiar with these things, what and how it happened exactly. Because, 
yes, I have some general knowledge, but it is really out of my everyday work. 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay, then, let me turn to the following. Would you say that the support provided 
by NATO at the 2014 Wales summit and the 2016 Warsaw conference was a proportional 
response to the Russian movements. 
Mr. Murd: I think so, yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: Would you call it a necessary response to the changing situation? 
Mr. Murd: Yes, I think so. 
Mr. van Eijk: And would you say that it is an adequate repayment, if I may term it this way, and 
this is very materialistic, I’m terribly sorry; would you say that it is an adequate repayment of the 
commitments you have, basically, taken upon yourself in engaging in NATO missions and 
delivering your share of the troops? Would you say that this is the reciprocity that NATO is built 
upon? 
Mr. Murd: Yes, I know what you mean. I don’t know, but I think that probably we are not 
thinking about it in these categories. Our understanding is, that as a member of NATO, we have 
obligations, we have to fulfill our obligations, if our contribution is needed, we have to provide 
it. And of course, that means that we expect that all other NATO-allies share this approach. Let 
me put it this way. 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay, thank you. Then, finally, I want to shift, for the last time, to get a sense of 
the inter-Baltic cooperation that is happening. Could you give me a sense of, in what fashion you 
and Lithuania and Latvia cooperate on an international basis? Because I have seen some reports 
of, for instance, I think it’s the Community of Baltic Sea States, and I think there are one or two 
other… How important is inter-Baltic cooperation and what form does it take, if I may ask? 
Mr. Murd: Yes, it is very important. There are structures, formal and informal. It’s more or less 
like the cooperation between the Benelux countries. For example, there is a Baltic parliamentary 
assembly, there are regular ministerial meetings between Baltic states. There are a lot of common 
interests: security policy, infrastructure, environmental issues of course. But at the same time, of 
course, there are so many other formats and things, and of course we are all members of the 
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European Union. And in the European Union, of course, sometimes we have common interests, 
sometimes not. You may know that there are no fixed coalitions in the European Union. 
Mr. van Eijk: No, there are not. 
Mr. Murd: It depends on the issue and there may be very unexpected coalitions in some cases. 
But, yes, Baltic cooperation is definitely very important. 
Mr. van Eijk: Would you say there is one specific policy area that transcends all else in that 
sense? That there is one specific part on which cooperation is the most important? With this 
sense shared by all three states? 
Mr. Murd: No, not really, I think. It’s so horizontal, covering all fields of life. No, I can’t single 
out just one topic or one area. 
Mr. van Eijk: Then, I think we have covered basically all that I wanted to ask. Then, I want to 
sincerely thank you for the time that you have given me. I appreciate the help beyond measure. 
END OF THE TRANSCRIPT 
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Appendix B: Interview Transcript Mr. Semaška 
Date: 16-05-2017 
Location: The Hague, the Netherlands 
START OF THE TRANSCRIPT 
Mr. van Eijk: I must admit I’m a bit new to actually interviewing people, so please bear with me 
over the coming hour or how much time we actually have. So, I’ll do my best and if anything is 
unclear, please let me know and I will try to elaborate as much I can. Right, if I may, could we 
go back in time about twenty-five years, back to the time that you regained your independence 
from the United… from the USSR. Just to get a sense of how the Lithuanian republic viewed the 
world at that time, could you give me a short overview of the main threats and challenges that 
your newly reborn state faced at that moment? What were the challenges you faced? 
Mr. Semaška: Well, first of all the survival. The state building and at the same time survival; to 
somehow survive. 
Mr. van Eijk: And this survival, in what sense? 
Mr. Semaška: And at the same time to transform, at the same time to… That’s real amazing to 
recall, I mean, that especially now, from today’s perspective, to look to how bold and brave we 
were. 
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely. 
Mr. Semaška: And, on the one hand we were dealing with the superpower… I mean, because of 
which… which really was exercising terror at several times. So… Also, the repetition of terror 
wasn’t excluded.  
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely. 
Mr. Semaška: And we were the nation which really suffered a lot under Soviet terror. Both my 
parents grew up in deportation, my grandfather was executed, grandmother died of starvation in 
Siberia, the brother of my mother died of starvation in Siberia. You have those stories in each 
and every family. Because of that terror; terror is effective in a sense that it forces, I mean, 
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people to accommodate for the sake of survival. We already had some of that accommodation in 
terms of collaboration with the regime, or seeking careers within this system, or preferring not to 
tell the children in the family about the story of the country and of their own family. There were 
lots of people that did not know that their grandparents were born in deportation, or that part of 
the family perished because of this terror. So… But still it was in some families… In some 
families that this legacy of the independent nation, of the country was still very strong. I 
remember my… That was the case in my family. We were living that dual life. When I would 
come back from school, and at school again the teachers were pretending that they were playing 
their role, but both sides knew… When we grew up, in the senior classes, we already were quite 
well aware that they played their role and we played our role. 
Mr. van Eijk: So, basically, every citizen had a dual life, would you say that? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes, in many cases. Not everyone, but in many cases that was the case. I would 
come back home and I find my grandfather sitting at the radio set and listening to the BBC or 
Voice of America or Radio Europe or Deutsche Welle, and the jamming session would come in 
and he would switch to another wave. So that was… Throughout the evening. Whatever he does, 
whatever he worked on, the radio was on and I lived in the evening in that sound… 
Mr. van Eijk: … Of radio static? 
Mr. Semaška: … Of truth coming from the West, you know?! That was kind of a simplified 
picture of what was going on. 
Mr. van Eijk: It’s a very clear picture. 
Mr. Semaška: In my understanding… Of course, when you grow up… Sometimes, when you are 
a kid you cannot always adequately assess that dual life and what is appropriate in which 
situations. There were cases that I was putting my teachers into awkward situations and they 
were very smart ones, not giving in; I mean, addressing KGB or indicating my parents as the 
family not reliable or kind of... They would come to my parents and say: look, ask your kid to 
keep a low profile on that issue. So, at my school, I was quite lucky to have that kind of teachers 
who were brave enough to act like that. But just to give you an impression of what was going on. 
Basically, a big part of the population… These days, we are a bit, kind of, hurt when I hear the 
assessment ‘former Soviet republic,’ ‘former communist nation.’ 
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Mr. van Eijk: There was a legacy before that. 
Mr. Semaška: We were an occupied nation. The relationship between us and the regime was that 
they were occupants. The system that they brought was not genuinely produced in our country. 
Mr. van Eijk: It was imposed? 
Mr. Semaška: It was something that the occupant brought that we accommodated to, but that was 
not ours. We were not a sincere part of that. We were not those who believed in that system, 
trusted that system. Simply, we had to survive.  
Mr. van Eijk: Yeah. 
Mr. Semaška: And that is, I think, the major difference between us and the Russians, for 
instance. Who themselves created that system and believed in that system; who still glorify that 
system. And now again it’s one of the risk factors, I would say, or one of the factors of threat; 
security factors for us, that this system is once again being glorified and this glorification is 
being led by the Kremlin. And again, the text books – history textbooks – are being changed and 
accommodated to basically put to the first place the glory of and the achievements by Russia, at 
that time Soviet Russia, and not putting emphasis on how it was achieved and the terror. So, that 
was… We had to get out of that. So, on the one hand, we had to learn to get rid of this dual life. 
Again, that was also… Generally, I mean, it was also leading to some demoralization and you 
had to be really strong to know what are the real values, because stealing from the state was not a 
sin, in soviet times. Well, that regime imposed on you certain – this stupid communist system – 
and stealing for many people, stealing from the factory where you worked, it was not a sin. 
Because that is a factory owned by this regime and it is… So, of course the atheistic ideology 
also played a role to eradicate and pushed away or very much pressed on people to not practice 
religion. So, that was pushing out the value system and not bringing in a strong value system or 
strong foundations; bringing in this dual situation where you were living this dual life. And then 
not all people could really develop into members of the society. So, that is one of the major 
harms also done by that occupation, together with that system. Again, to return back to 
normality; to reintroduce values was also part of the challenge. Not only to resist the economic 
pressure and we had immediately after the proclamation of our independence in 1990, in March, 
the eleventh of March, a month later we got the economic embargo and which was lasting for 
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more than half a year, almost a year, an economic embargo by Russia. So, that was another big 
challenge. 
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely. 
Mr. Semaška: But the will of the people to become independent was so strong that it basically 
mobilized the people and did not have that big effect on changing the opinion. 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay. So, you’d say that, internally, state and nation-building was the main… Or, 
well, basically, the main challenge of the day, if I may term it that way? 
Mr. Semaška: The nation was there, but… 
Mr. van Eijk: The nation was there? 
Mr. Semaška: But, the… 
Mr. van Eijk: But it needed to get its state back? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes, to get the institutions… To get the consensus in the society on how we 
organize our society… To build… To rebuild democratic institutions. On paper, it looks simple, 
but to practice it… I think we did it quite successfully. So, I mean, there was a wide range of 
challenges that somehow we parallelly tackled each of them at the same time, gradually, when 
moving forward. Of course, that was combined with the major, well, shock to the economy, 
because the whole economy was part of the Soviet Union economy. Here it is not only since we 
had to shift from a planned economy to a market economy, but also we had to deal with a 
challenge that was much bigger than the forthcoming Brexit. Because, now you have like five 
percent or ten percent of your economy integrated with the British economy, so that is perceived 
as a huge challenge for the Dutch economy. But in our case, we had one-hundred percent 
integration and we were part of the chain of production. So, it’s a part of shifting to a market 
economy, also a physical cut in ties with the other parts of the production chain, led to the 
collapse of many businesses; led to a huge downturn in economic production and welfare. We 
may call what was then welfare, a certain minimum existence level that we had. So, that was 
another very big challenge. But you know, it was amazing to see how the transformation of the 
mentality was taking place. My mother regained property rights to her father’s land, forest, in 
Western Lithuania. Then would be 1993, early 1993, there was a big storm, produced a lot of 
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windfall in the forest and it was necessary to clean the forest. There was… My mother could not 
find anyone who would buy that timber lying there, so that you would go there and take it out of 
that swampy forest and then sell it and process it. No, there was no willingness. No, kind of, no 
demand… No, there was a demand for the final product but no supply of services that would…  
Mr. van Eijk: So, there was a supply, there was a demand, but nothing in between? 
Mr. Semaška: Nothing in between. Nothing in between, you know. And, well I then was a 
student in Denmark and she gave me a call: ‘look, in the summer you have to come back, we 
have to take care of our forest.’ And I remember, none of the… Going there with my mother and 
none of the local farmers or residents in the area would like to be hired by some city guy who 
came here and was… Even though I was offering, we were offering much higher compensation 
than they would get in the cooperative or they would otherwise earn. The very idea that this city 
guy came and now was… It’s not the state, not cooperative, but this city guy wants to hire them, 
was unacceptable. It was still 1993, the summer of 1993. It was very difficult, we managed… 
Finally, in a thirty-kilometer radius, area, found people who agreed to be hired and to come with 
their tractors to pull out or… And I found a company that would process the timber and 
eventually I found the construction company that would buy the timer. So, I made the full… 
Mr. van Eijk: You made the entire chain? 
Mr. Semaška: … The entire chain. And we earned a good fortune on that. And next year, when 
the local people saw that this city guy, he did not sink in that swamp, but he made a good fortune 
out of that. And the next year, again, we had to do some work on the forest, because not 
everyone around cleaned their forest, pieces and lots. When you leave the timber rotting, it gets a 
lot of insects and those insects attack weaker trees. So, then you get drying out, some trees 
drying out. And you have, again, to fell them, to cut them out. So, we had to do some extra work 
there and it was much easier. There was already a lot of farmers around, who were offering their 
services. And, that was 1994, and in 1995 there were hundreds of companies around that you 
would just show the lot and they would do everything, from A till Z. 
Mr. van Eijk: So, in two years… 
Mr. Semaška: In two years time such a dramatic development… 
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Mr. van Eijk: That is a dramatic change. 
Mr. Semaška: … In entrepreneurship, in mentality, in regaining a sense of entrepreneurship. So, 
that was a quite dramatic point in time. 
Mr. van Eijk: That is remarkable, indeed. That is a very quick shift. 
Mr. Semaška: I think very, very indicative of what was happening then. But at the same time, in 
1995, we already proclaimed our wish to become a member of the EU and NATO. Well, when it 
comes to NATO, I think in 1994 we already made a letter, which then was causing smiles in the 
faces of many interlocuters in the West. But… And I remember then our… Now, during the 
campaign before the referendum on the EU-Ukraine association treaty, I was participating in a 
number of meetings and I was bringing our example. In 1995, when we concluded our 
association agreement with the EU, the Dutch exports to Lithuania were close to zero and now 
they are fluctuating in between – already for a number or years – they fluctuate somewhere in 
between 1.2 to 1.5 billion euros annually. That is now. Even before the Russians introduced 
sanctions, that Dutch exports to Lithuania were only four times less than to Russia. Because your 
exports to Russia were six billion before sanctions and now they are only two billion; now your 
exports to Russia are only two billion. To Lithuania 1.5 billion, a three million strong market; 
and to Russia it’s two billion. So, just for you to understand what we have achieved… 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes, absolutely. 
Mr. Semaška: … And how the Lithuanian purchasing capacity has blown up. Then our total 
imports were, I think, three billion US dollars, total. Lithuanian imports in ninety-five. Today, 
they are twenty-five billion euros-worth. That’s a nine-times increase. 
Mr. van Eijk: That’s quite an increase. 
Mr. Semaška: And… So, that’s what, I mean, how we grew from where we were. 
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely, and that in just twenty-five years. Yeah, just over twenty-five years… 
Mr. Semaška: Twenty-seven. We started in 1990. 
Mr. van Eijk: 1990, of course. Then it is exactly twenty-seven. 
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Mr. Semaška: Because in 1990… Well, in the West it’s always mentioned as this date: 1991. 
But, that is the date when most of the Western nations recognized us. 
Mr. van Eijk: Ah. That’s a very important distinction. 
Mr. Semaška: But for us, the date is the eleventh of March, 1990.  
Mr. van Eijk: It’s very good to get that properly on paper, because I have been working with 
1991 as the date as well. But now I can get the proper date in there. 
Mr. Semaška: Since, that date was after the coup in Moscow, and by that time already for a year 
and a half we were fighting, I mean, for the statehood. And we were already running our own 
elected parliament, we were running our laws, we were changing the system in Lithuania, but we 
still did not control the borders. And we still had this semi-war situation with Russia. 
Mr. van Eijk: So, it was still somewhat a voluntary system under a different formal system, could 
you put it that way? So, that, your system, well in your eyes, it was the legitimate system and the 
way to go. But, then, formally, in the world view, the USSR still had some control? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: So, all of this means that you… As soon as you regained control over your entire 
territory, you made a shift to the west. Was this effort a choice, or have I gathered it properly that 
it was an inevitability? You… The East, you were done with that and you were a part of Europe. 
Mr. Semaška: I mean, for us, I mean, the East was an occupant, the occupying power, and the 
West was something we belonged to. We, I mean, already since, well… We made that choice to 
the West already back in 1385, when our Grand Duke opted… Then we were on of the biggest 
countries in Europe, or the biggest perhaps in Europe. And the most stubborn, because we were 
the last Pagans. Because we had orthodox Christianity to the East and there was Western 
Christianity to the North, West, and South. And we were pagans. And we ruled vast areas of 
orthodox Christians in the East, some Western Christians in the South. But then, we had those 
permanent… Well, really since the middle or the beginning of the thirteenth century, for a 
hundred-fifty years, we had those repetitiously occurring crusades against Lithuania, from 
Eastern Prussia or Livonia, because we were the last Pagan – non-Christian – country in Europe 
and our Grand Duke decided it was high time to become Christian in order to get rid of that…; to 
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remove, eliminate the motivation for crusaders to get support, to gather forces against us for each 
crusade. Then, the Grand Duke was opting in between Eastern Christianity and Western 
Christianity, and eventually Polish and Hungarian envoys convinced him to opt for Western 
Christianity. Because what they did: they offered him to marry the Hungarian Duchess and 
inhere the Polish crown. Thus, he, by this personal union, this marriage, he became the King of 
Poland. King of Poland and remained Grand Duke of Lithuania, and King of Poland. This 
personal union lasted until the middle of the Sixteenth Century, until 1569. When we, because of 
the pressure of Moscow, we had to get Polish structural military support against Moscow, and 
we went then into formal… We handed over Ukraine to Poland, because we were the rulers of 
Ukraine. We handed over Ukraine to Poland, in return we got military support in the fight 
against Moscow. So, that was, I mean, already then, our kind of major shift and choice of being 
with Western Europe. Because, to the East we had orthodox Christianity and we became part of 
the Western Christian world. Then, it is interesting, then a bit later, in the Sixteenth Century also, 
rivalry between Protestantism and Catholicism, we had that in Lithuania as well. We were half 
and half, half nobility opted for Calvinism or Lutherism and half opted for Catholicism. But we 
did not have… we never had physical violence. It was always a fight for power in the court, in 
the state, but never it turned into violent fights. It was intellectual, very much also intellectual, 
thus we got the first university in 1579, because Jesuits established the university to withstand 
this pressure of protestant ideas spreading in the country. So, then the first Bible in Lithuanian 
language… Because, then our nobility was taking over Polish, as the language for nobility. As 
French was here, so in our area it was Polish, because we got this Western culture via Poland. 
And, but of course, to reach the masses, the common people, you had to come in their language, 
and the first Bible in Lithuanian was done with the support of Dutch Calvinists. It was translated 
here in Amsterdam, and… 
Mr. van Eijk: That’s funny, yeah. 
Mr. Semaška: … It was in the mid-Seventeenth Century. Okay, that was about us being part of 
Western world. Then, in 1795, this Commonwealth of Lithuania and Poland, that’s Kingdom of 
Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was divided by Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburg 
Empire. And then, after the First World War, we already established Lithuania as an independent 
state without ties to former union partners. So, we established a democratic republic, ethnic-
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based… Well, ethnic-based, with the ethnic boundaries, which was much, much smaller. And 
that was a new chapter. Again, 1918 was a reestablishment of statehood, we had that statehood 
already for a millennium before. The first mentioning of Lithuania as a country we know, dates 
back to 1009. 
Mr. van Eijk: Wow. 
Mr. Semaška: [Laughing] When Monk Bruno and his mission, Bruno and seventeen of his 
companions, were killed by Lithuanian Pagans on the border of Lithuania and Russia. So, that 
record mentions border of Lithuania and Russia and Lithuania as a country. 
Mr. van Eijk: [Laughing] That’s a very long legacy then. 
Mr. Semaška: [Laughing] So, we celebrated… In 2009 we celebrated the millennium of the 
country and basically the fact that we celebrated was the killing of seventeen monks, seventeen 
missionaries by Lithuanian Pagans.  
Mr. van Eijk: [Laughing] You have got a lot of history. That’s something. So, it was, to recap, 
there was no choice. You were a part of the West and the East was just an occupying 
intermission and was ousted in 1991? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes, yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: Perfect, then we have got that straight. Then, when we bring all of this to 
contemporary times, would you say that some of the views and maybe the threat definitions from 
that time still persist today? Maybe in a different form, but do some of those apprehensions and 
considerations still animate policy to this day? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes, of course. You… We live on the outskirts of Western Europe. We are on the 
barrier, the cordon… We played the role of the cordon back in 1918, when we reestablished our 
state. Again it was done very much due to German and British support, partly French, but 
mostly… And to a certain extent American, but mostly German and British support. Both, I 
mean, wanted to have a cordon against Bolsheviks. So, you know, we are on the outskirts, we are 
the border, and we are the border country of NATO. Well, we understand where we are and 
what… We are not in a different… We follow closely what is happening on the other side, in the 
East.  
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Mr. van Eijk: I think I read something similar in your National Security Concept. 
Mr. Semaška: … Belarus is militarily fully integrated into Russia. So, we speak, even though in 
the East… It’s funny enough we have a direct border with Russia in the West, that’s with former 
Eastern Prussia, which was formerly Germany, but now this small piece of Eastern Prussia 
belongs to Russia and it is called Kaliningrad. 
Mr. van Eijk: Kaliningrad, yes. 
Mr. Semaška: But, and formally in the East we have a border with Belarus, but in fact militarily 
that is Russia. And, what is happening in Russia, of course, is a matter of big concern. The return 
to revengism and the glorification of this Soviet power. Statements that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was the biggest tragedy of the Twentieth Century. Statements by president Putin, and… 
But these are just, kind of, they are much more deeper and much more deeper things that are 
happening. We see that country very actively trying to do what they did in Ukraine, before 
aggression. Trying to meddle into Russian-speaking community, which is not in Lithuania very 
big, it’s six percent. But still, it is enough to create turmoil, in case there is a situation. We see 
very… There are attacks… I mean, ongoing already for a few years is an information war. We 
see cyber-attacks. We see efforts to penetrate into different stratus of society and to sew this 
mistrust of disbelieve in your own state. And you see that that is being done. I mean, the sources 
of those messages are there, open, even not covert; but very open, straightforward. They abuse 
our freedom of speech, our freedom of media, our freedom of assembly. We even read… We had 
a situation when a Russian Consul-General in Klaipėda, our sea-port, a city with 160.000 strong 
population. Among… In that population around 25.000 Russian-speakers, all of them are those 
who came after the Second World War or are descendants of those who came after the Second 
World War, and so we have Consul-General and his two deputies directly making an effort to 
mobilize the Russian-speaking NGOs and organizations for civil-disobedience actions against 
the Lithuanian government. That is just one example. Or you have, I mean, efforts to engage 
students in Russian-language schools. We have those as well, for those Russians that want to 
educate their kids in Russian-language schools, we have Russian-language schools. Where all the 
subjects, with an exception of fifteen percent; fifteen percent is given in the Lithuanian language 
and eighty-five percent is given in Russian. 
Mr. van Eijk: But that is very grand of you. 
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Mr. Semaška: And, then we see that, I mean, with the funds from Russia, students from those 
schools are recruited to student camps in Russia, and we find that those students camps are 
military training. So, it’s military training, it is also indoctrination, it is also… So, basically, 
direct efforts to prepare, I mean, fifth column and to prepare possible mutineers.  
Mr. van Eijk: That is indeed a threat. 
Mr. Semaška: And we can go on! I mean, with different efforts by Russia to really prepare 
ground that in case there is a situation favorable to their goals, that they have a locally good 
ground, or favorable ground for these hybrid situations where you have disturbances, turbulence, 
as if genuine local rebellion or protest. What they did in Eastern Ukraine, basically. 
Mr. van Eijk: And this has been going on ever since, you regained your… 
Mr. Semaška: Since Putin came into power. Since 2000. We, I mean, that’s very much clear. 
Soon after that, we have started to observe a clear effort to, in a very well organized way, to 
approach different stratus, to build up their, their, constituency. So, that is a big matter of 
concern, and that also reminds us of where we are and what we should be ready for.  
Mr. van Eijk: Does it at all remind of the Soviet times? Such actions, to actually rile… Well, I 
don’t know how I can phrase this properly, but to… It seems like Russia attempts to once again 
occupy parts of the Lithuanian society, for that matter. Apparently, their Russian minority then. 
But, yeah, does it remind of the Soviet times, such actions and such activities?  
Mr. Semaška: Yes. Yes, of course it reminds. And this is a controversy, because it is about… It 
is also about, even in such things as art or architectural legacy, or certain monuments or 
cemeteries, which Russians did in central parts of towns. Now, we are moving out those 
cemeteries, each of those with monuments to Soviet warrior or liberator. For us, he was not a 
liberator; he was an occupier. 
Mr. van Eijk: He was an occupier, yeah. 
Mr. Semaška: He was pushing out one occupant, but another occupant was coming in. And, 
actually, even, to a certain extent, to some Lithuanian people who were subject to a direct attack 
of Russian terror, of Soviet terror, in 1940, when they occupied us in 1940 and stayed until 1941, 
when Germans pushed out. So, one week before Germans came in, we had 30.000 Lithuanian 
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people, including my mother’s family, deported to Siberia; and men separated from men and 
women and put into concentration camps in Russia. None of them survived. Some of the women 
and children survived, but none of the men survived.  
Mr. van Eijk: Wow. 
Mr. Semaška: So, after that, we had people who were disappearing, I mean, all of those high-
ranking officials, officers who were disappearing throughout that year and no-one knows where 
they disappeared. That was an exercise of Stalin terror in Lithuania. So, when the Germans came 
in, of course, apart from the Jewish population, for them that was a complete catastrophe, but for 
many ethnic Lithuanians, the Germans came as liberators, after that Soviet terror, you know, that 
experience of Soviet terror throughout that year. So, that was… And then, when Germans were 
retreating to the West, we had about a hundred-thousand Lithuanian middle class people and 
richer farmers, who were retreating together with the Germans, and did not want to stay, because 
they knew what is ahead when this red wave comes in, you know. Again, it turns back to 
Lithuania. So, that was the… And for us, now these monuments to Soviet soldiers, I mean we 
understand that each fallen soldier has to be treated with respect and we do that when we move 
the cemetery to some other place, with decent respect. But, Russians always make out of it a big 
political issue.  
Mr. van Eijk: Of course. 
Mr. Semaška: The desecration of… At the same time, they try to preserve that; they try to make 
out of it a big… Because that is also, you know… When someone is passing by, he always sees 
that monument to the liberator. That message, you know, definitely… Youngsters these days are 
not that much interested in history, they no longer are interested to listen to the stories of their 
grandparents. And, what is left, is what you see each day, and you see a monument to a liberator. 
Mr. van Eijk: Exactly. 
Mr. Semaška: And that gradually settles into your perception, if that is not disputed, if that is not 
vitalized. So, that is a fight still ongoing. For these signs, for these signs of Soviet legacy.  
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely. Then, if I may, could we shift to NATO? On the website of your 
foreign ministry and in the National Security Concepts that I have been reading and 
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downloading, whenever you talk of your national security, talk of international security 
immediately follows; and NATO is always mentioned as the locus of your security, if I might 
term it that way. Is that correct? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: Is NATO the way through which national security is guaranteed? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes, definitely.  
Mr. van Eijk: That’s an easy answer. 
Mr. Semaška: There are certain, now, significant additions to that. Because… Getting back to the 
time when we joined NATO; the time when a major message in each and every statement of 
NATO, if you look through the statements of the summits, you will find them: no risk of direct 
attack on NATO territory in the foreseeable future.  
Mr. van Eijk: Yeah. 
Mr. Semaška: That was the major idea. NATO was looking for… Well, was looking for 
meaningful activity outside of the area. And, of course, then to, politically, I mean, it was not 
that easy to maintain a high spending on defense. On the one hand, you are in the most reliable 
alliance in the world. On the other hand, well, you have the statements that there is no risk of 
direct attack on the territory of NATO in the foreseeable future. So, then, of course, the spending 
of defense was not going down, but with the economy growing, the spending on defense was not 
that fast growing. So, the ratio to GDP was getting, again, by the time we joined NATO was 
almost about reaching two percent, but not reached ever, but was close to that, and then started 
going down. Because, economically, those were boom years. 2005, 2006, 2007, before the crisis, 
we had nine, ten percent growth annually. Of course, in that dramatic growth, the defense 
expenditure was far from growing that fast; the share to GDP was going down. With these 
limited resources, the option was that we have to spend that money on something that is needed 
for NATO, so we, in spite of organizing total defense of the country, we downscaled to well-
prepared, small units, that perform certain niche functions for NATO operations abroad. So, 
basically what we did, the bulk of the budget was spent for joining the coalition of the willing in 
Iraq and mostly on Afghanistan, because we were running a provincial reconstruction team in 
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Afghanistan. So, those operations, they were taking up a major part of the defense budget. Then 
suddenly, we understood that in 2014 that, look… Well, first of all, it is before that. Already in 
2009, already we saw signs… 
Mr. van Eijk: Following the Russo-Georgian War, I take it? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes. In 2008, Russia attacked Georgia, and our intelligence was issuing very 
worrying signals. Because already in 2009, the Russians had a major, big military drill “Zapad” 
next to our borders; they will have it this year again. Extremely large scale, this year. Then they 
had some fifteen-thousand troops participating, but also all the missile systems in Kaliningrad 
district and the tactical weapons there; they have nuclear weapons there. And we saw, our 
intelligence saw a tactical nuclear weapon also being used in that military drill. So… And, they 
had a direct scenario of taking over the control of Lithuanian territory and connecting their force 
with Belarus and Kaliningrad district. So, those worrying signals were already then. And we 
suddenly understood that there were no NATO defense plans for the Baltic states. Basically, 
there is a political promise, but… 
Mr. van Eijk: They did not deliver? 
Mr. Semaška: No. No concrete defense plans. I mean, what in case? Then, the major goal was to 
achieve those NATO defense plans, which was not that easy. Because, even the fact to admit 
publicly that there are no defense plans for the Baltic states was something we could not do. So, 
it was necessary to, kind of, get into very tough exchanges on the working level, but at the same 
time to exert some pressure.  
Mr. van Eijk: So, could we summarize this as: your national units were geared towards 
international security, and the international community should be geared towards your national 
security, but they were not, de facto? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes, yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: So, you said that as soon as 2008-2009, you started to see a build-up in Russia, and 
you started to actually attempt to, basically, convince NATO that this was a problem; that this 
was becoming a threat real quick, if I am correct. Does that mean that you, essentially, especially 
from 2008 onwards, disagreed with NATO’s ‘there is no attack in the immediate future;’ did you 
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disagree with that statement and with the discourse of positive engagement, that we will only 
engage with Russia but we will not build up troops, because we do not want to scare or…? 
Mr. Semaška: Increasingly, we started opposing to that and bringing in the effort to pay attention 
to the risks and threats coming from Russia. Then, already after the invasion into Ukraine, we 
understood… Well, just before the invasion in Ukraine, we started dramatically increasing our 
defense spending. We understood that, not only we have to perform the certain niche function in 
NATO, but also we have to ourselves be ready to create a lot of obstacle for… Of course, we 
cannot withstand Russia, but we have to have forces that create a lot of headache, a lot of 
obstacles for… 
Mr. van Eijk: I have heard the term: a speedbump, essentially.  
Mr. Semaška: Yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: So, be ready yourselves, because NATO is not, basically? 
Mr. Semaška: Well, NATO it seems, then, well… Of course, it was in a matter of two-years’ 
time, when already NATO had, in 2011 they already had the defense plans for the Baltic states. 
That was an achievement. 
Mr. van Eijk: And what was your position in getting those agreed upon? That was your doing? 
Mr. Semaška: I cannot talk too much about… 
Mr. van Eijk: Of course. 
Mr. Semaška: That was a very intensive effort by our president. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yeah, she is very outspoken.  
Mr. Semaška: That is part of the method on how to achieve what you want.  
Mr. van Eijk: Fair enough. 
Mr. Semaška: But, apart from that, there are many other things. But, again, still not the time to 
comprehensively discuss it. 
Mr. van Eijk: Of course. Let me then just… So, if I may summarize all this. So, by the time that 
the Crimean Crisis actually transpired in 2014, were you not surprised to see it happen, if I may 
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term it that way? Did you expect… Well, expect is probably a bit much, but were you surprised 
that something happened? Or did it fit the pattern you already discerned? 
Mr. Semaška: No, we were not. Because, already before the Georgian..., the invasion into 
Georgia, we already were… Our representative, my predecessor… In 2008, in autumn, I became 
the Lithuanian representative to Political and Security Committee in Brussels, PSC. Before, I 
was ambassador in Budapest, from Budapest I moved to become the deputy head to our mission 
to the European Union and also ambassador to Political and Security Committee. And I came 
soon after the invasion into Georgia. My predecessor there, was already for a few months before, 
basically, issuing messages to his colleagues around the table that: look, something will happen 
in Georgia. Because, what we saw… What we saw, two years before, already for two years 
before the invasion into Georgia, Russians were preparing for that invasion with very visible 
signs. That is, withdrawing from Conventional Forces in Europe agreement, accumulating their 
force in the Caucasus, building roads leading to Georgia. So, basically, preparing grounds for the 
quick deployment of troops into Georgia. All that was visible. And then provocations, intensity 
in pressure on Georgia… We saw that and we were issuing calls to our partners on that. And, 
before 2014, again in that… I mean, of course, we could not predict it would happen in that way, 
but that the tension was growing, that the threat was there; we were talking about that.  
Mr. van Eijk: And, before 2014, NATO – your partners – did not share the same view? They 
had, at least that is what I have read, is it correct that before 2014 especially, that you advocated 
this different view that was basically entirely opposed to the discourse that NATO and the larger 
Western allies adopted? I think I am quoting Philip Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, in that he said that, essentially, NATO treated the Russo-Georgian War as a “single, 
isolated, one-off case.” That this will not happen again, we will simply continue engaging with 
Russia on an economic basis, we will not build up any troops; this will not happen again. You, if 
I am gathering this correctly, stated it will happen again. Even before 2014, even before 2008. 
But they did not listen? 
Mr. Semaška: Well, we were saying that there is a high risk that… 
Mr. van Eijk: That something might happen again? 
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Mr. Semaška: Especially after… We were the only one country, and then I was playing that role 
of the Lithuanian representative in the EU Political and Security Committee, in the discussions… 
And then, having no vote… But there had to be a vote, because when the EU returned back to, in 
late autumn of 2008… In September, the EU said “no business as usual,” but later in the autumn, 
in November, December, returned back to negotiating with Russians on the new partnership 
agreement. And we were the only country that was to the very end opposing that. It was a foreign 
policy decision, and it had to have consensus. But at that time, the EU, well, by not changing our 
mind, our partners in the EU played the other way, they interpreted that that is an economic 
decision and the competence of the Commission. That it is the EU competence and not a foreign 
policy decision, therefore consensus is not needed, and went with negotiations, the continuation 
or renewing negotiations with Russia. That meant returning to business as usual. And… So, that 
was a very bitter situation. I remember, the very fact that you remain alone is quite bitter. Then, 
of course, we were not willing again to find ourselves in that situation, and we are always 
looking for partners, in order to stand with someone else. 
Mr. van Eijk: And did you find these partners in the Baltic states. Do Estonia and Latvia share 
this view that you have, that you advocated here? At least more than other European countries? 
Mr. Semaška: We do not expect too much from our brothers and sisters, as long as they are in a 
more complicated situation. They have much more sizable Russian minorities, they have their 
own domestic political processes, and they have to take that into account. We understand that. 
Therefore, we do not blame them for not fully supporting the case. Though, when we discuss, we 
are on the same page, but, of course, the domestic political process does not allow them to be as 
radical as we are. If I may use that word. Or that strong, or that tough, or that stubborn. You 
remember, back in the Fourteenth Century, the last Pagan country in Europe.  
Mr. van Eijk: [Laughing] Stubbornness, it is in your nature. Okay, so… Right, then we’re turning 
to, or actually focusing on one of the most important points… 
Mr. Semaška: Just to mention… 
Mr. van Eijk: Yeah, sure. 
Mr. Semaška : .. But then, still, I mean, this effort to engage Russia was so strong that still in 
2010, in the Summit, the NATO Summit in Lisbon, we had to fight for preventing the inclusion 
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of Russians into the architecture of the Missile Defense System. We managed to achieve that, but 
we had to fight for it. To fight for prevention. 
Mr. van Eijk: That is a remarkable influence that you had over NATO then. Following all these 
theories that small states cannot do anything and then you prevented something like that. 
Mr. Semaška: Perhaps, these days, if you would recognize that… 
Mr. van Eijk: Absolutely, I completely agree with that. 
Mr. Semaška: … We had a say in that. 
Mr. van Eijk: [Mutters] Russian accession to missile defense. 
Mr. Semaška: Not accession, this was inclusion into certain elements of the missile defense 
system. It was called then, in NATO-slang, into the ‘architecture’ of missile defense. 
Mr. van Eijk: And, well this is a beautiful example of Lithuanian influence over NATO. How 
does, in 2012, I believe, at the Chicago Summit, you managed to get the Baltic air policing 
mission extended on a permanent basis. How does that fit into all of this? Because that, too, is a 
remarkable, and beautiful, instance of influence over such a large alliance. How does that fit into 
all that we just talked about?  
Mr. Semaška: It is a consistent, stubborn work for over a number of years, and finding also the 
favorable moments. For us, at that time, with a number of NATO countries spending less and 
less on defense, the effort was to look for how could we with this smaller funding organize it 
more smartly? There was a need for these smart defense examples, and this came out as 
something, well… Look, the Baltics do not have the means to provide for credible air force, and 
even don’t… It is not a defense; it is air policing. It is, basically, some control of the air space, or 
at least message to Russia that: look, we know what is happening in our skies. So, that was an 
opportunity and we used that opportunity, to get that as an example of smart defense. We do not 
spend on building… Each of us buying two or three planes, but, because, we would not have 
managed more, but getting the alliance support for that and in return sending our troops to 
NATO missions against a foe somewhere else.  
Mr. van Eijk: And was this… I believe you led this charge. Did you cooperate with any other 
countries on this proposal? 
73 
 
Mr. Semaška: Of course, for us, it was, first of all, the three Baltic states, and that was not that 
easy. But, we had the best infrastructure for that, we had the airport, etcetera. But, Estonians 
were also rapidly developing the infrastructure and, of course, they also wanted to have, 
eventually, the operation being led from Estonia. Now, we have, which is very sound and good, 
because it means that we have not just one major base, but we have two major bases, double 
capacity, not only in Lithuania, but we have… At some point, Gdansk – a Polish base – was used 
for Baltic air policing. Our base, Estonian base. So, now we have much more capacity in the 
area, which is already in itself an achievement. But it was not that easy to achieve that. Again, a 
lot of consideration that it will be provocative to Russia, etcetera, etcetera. 
Mr. van Eijk: Yeah.  
Mr. Semaška: We always had to deal with this notion of provocation vis-à-vis the Russians. 
Mr. van Eijk: That sounds exactly like what I have read. And then, especially given all of this, 
and how difficult it was to extract something like that from NATO… The, basically, the 
swiftness, the rapidness, with which troops actually were, at least, small combat battalions were 
deployed to the Baltic states on a rotational basis, I believe, after the 2014 Crimean Crisis, is a 
very interesting difference. Because, 2008 nothing happened, then in 2012, you managed to 
extract air policing, but no actual troops on the ground; and then, after the Crimean Crisis, all of 
a sudden, something was committed. Let’s start with this, that what was committed, I believe 
those were these Very High Readiness Task Force groups, if I am correct; were those 
commitments in 2014 and subsequently in 2016, what you wanted, if I may term it that way? 
Was it enough, in your view? That is probably a very… 
Mr. Semaška: Well, if you look now carefully to our statements by our president done last week 
vis-à-vis US forces in the region, after defense secretary Mattis visited Lithuania… 
Mr. van Eijk: I’ll look that up. 
Mr. Semaška: … So, you will see that this is considered to be a first… Well, not a first, but a 
certain good step in a sequence of good steps. But, of course, not something that fully meets the 
security requirements in the area. But, of course, it is a big achievement. We are grateful to the 
nations that contribute. We are very happy about the development. Well, you mentioned the 
speed in which the decisions were, first of all, the idea was generated, accepted, and then 
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implemented; it was really extraordinary for NATO, for this huge organization with twenty-eight 
member-states. So, we could not dream of that still in the beginning of 2015. Myself, in the 
Future Force Conference, here in Soesterberg, of 2015, I was actually the only one speaker from 
the diplomatic corps. And there, in my short presentation, I was presenting the challenge of 
access denial/anti access – A2/AD – situation in our area, and the actual Russian capabilities that 
they have, that actually create that situation; and calling for deployment of credible forces, on the 
ground, as the concept of reinforcement, upon which our defense is based, is under question, at a 
time when Russians can simply close the area. In a hybrid situation, you might have a situation 
when, in order to… It is still not a direct attack, but already a clear message, clear signs that you 
have to deploy the troops in the Baltics, to reinforce the Baltics, but you cannot go in, because 
any incoming ship, or plane, or train, or car, will be hit by Russian missiles from Kaliningrad 
district. But still, it is not a war. And then, you have… You are against the dilemma of what to 
do: to wait until the full come in, with… When they mass the troops around and you clearly see 
that will be then the operation fast to take over the territory, or you risk sending a plane, a ship, 
which will be knocked down by a Russian missile, and only then you have the kind of reason to 
really fight; or you take a pre-emptive strike and eliminate those systems in Kaliningrad district 
that create this AD/A2 situation, but that would be politically extremely difficult. So, that is why 
we started calling for credible forces on the ground. By doing that, we, well, to say the truth, I 
did not expect that would happen so fast. So, we are really satisfied in the way our partners 
replied, responded. But, of course, that is not enough.  
Mr. van Eijk: Granted. 
Mr. Semaška: We are satisfied, but that is not enough. We need more.  
Mr. van Eijk: Exactly. Yeah. Then, this speed is precisely the interesting part. Because, where 
did it come from? That is what I am wondering. Also, would you say that, for NATO at least, the 
Crimean Crisis was a wake-up call to some extent? 
Mr. Semaška: Yes. 
Mr. van Eijk: That that was… Yeah.  
Mr. Semaška: And you could clearly see that in the dramatic changes in the tone and in the mood 
within NATO in Wales. 
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Mr. van Eijk: Exactly, there is a very clear change. Also, and this requires a bit more 
introduction. At least, I am following discursive theory now. Before 2014, what we saw was this 
discourse of positive engagement with Russia, and then the Russo-Georgian War is an incident, 
we won’t focus on that, it is just engagement on an economic basis. Then, 2014 happened, and I 
think we can quite concretely say that that previous discourse – positive engagement – was 
delegitimized. Because, what was framed as an isolated incident, happened again; in a different 
guise, but something happened again. Which meant that, basically, there was a vacuum left, a 
discursive vacuum. And, judging by the way NATO has responded to the Crimean Crisis in the 
2014 and 2016 Summits, this discursive vacuum was, basically, filled with, at least to some 
extent, the view that your country had been advocating for the past, what will it have been, 
fifteen years? Would you say that this is something… Well, how can I phrase this. Did you… It 
is very difficult to put this into words, but… Let me put it in the most cliché of ways: were you 
the architect of this change in discourse? Because, most NATO allies, their discourse was 
delegitimized, and you, basically, had the answer available. We can explain what happened. We 
can offer strategic, basically, options to ameliorate this. Were you engaged in such a fashion, 
were you involved in this change of discourse? Because it seems highly likely. 
Mr. Semaška: Well… 
Mr. van Eijk: And I know, that is a mouthful. 
Mr. Semaška: Well, yeah. If you rush to boast or to take the credit for something, the next time, 
your ability to achieve something will be minimized.  
Mr. van Eijk: Of course. Never take credit for what you have achieved. Basically, frame it as the 
other’s achievement. So, if I am summarizing this correctly, you were the driving force, but you 
allowed NATO to take credit? 
Mr. Semaška: [Laughing] I will not answer that question. 
Mr. van Eijk: Fair enough. I think I catch the drift. Right, let me see what I have got left. Yeah, 
we have already talked a bit about what happened in Crimea wasn’t entirely a surprise for your 
country. So, what was the domestic response, if I may ask, to that crisis? How did the Lithuanian 
public respond to and deal with the Crimean crisis? 
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Mr. Semaška: Of course, there is a huge… It was already before the invasion into Crimea. You 
had all of these Maidan scenarios, or Maidan events, that were lasting, I mean, that started at the 
time when in Vilnius, in the EU Eastern Partnership Summit, then president Yanukovych refused 
to sign the association agreement. And you got in Kiev, in the central square of Kiev, those 
massive demonstrations. Pro-EU and against the president’s decision, against the government’s 
decision not to sign the association agreement. They grew into this massive opposition to the 
president and what is against the president. Already that was the time when there was a lot of 
sympathy support, solidarity with the Ukrainian nation, that was very much felt. Of course, all 
our media were reporting directly from Kiev, and it was the major news of the day to see what is 
happening there. That generated, really, a lot of support for Ukraine. And then the invasion into 
Crimea by Russia, and afterwards into Eastern Ukraine, that was… That strengthened that sense 
several times. So, they were kind of the nation that was trying to resist the aggressor that was 
aggressive against Lithuania for so many years, and Ukraine, well, really enjoyed, the Ukrainian 
people, a lot of sympathy, a lot of support, a lot of solidarity. And all stemming from the 
grassroots level, it was not organized by the state, by the country, by the government. Parallely, 
we have got a number of non-governmental organizations that started collecting funds, also 
including military-related equipment that was being purchased or collected and brought to 
Ukraine. There was a lot of these civic actions of that sort and, also, that gave birth, or very 
much strengthened, the perception that, look, we are ourselves, in a very vulnerable situation. 
And that we should not rely only on NATO and that we have to really, all of us, have certain 
responsibilities to our own country and we, then, reintroduced conscript service. And it is 
interesting that until this year, I mean, each year we get fully, I mean, we cannot call everyone, it 
was three thousand, now three thousand five-hundred, perhaps next year it will be four thousand. 
Of these young men who are conscripted, none of them, so far, was taken by draft, all of them 
are volunteers.  
Mr. van Eijk: Okay. 
Mr. Semaška: So, we have enough volunteers to fill in all the positions. Our paramilitary 
riflemen union, historically, we had it in the interwar period, that organization, so it was 
reconstituted and it got, the membership in that tripled, quadrupled. Even among mid-class 
people like me. I am not still, but if I return back, I will also join that organization, when I am 
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posted back to Vilnius. So, a lot of my acquaintances, of a similar age, they joined that rifleman 
union. Even though we are not youngsters anymore, but we are still strong and we show to the 
others also that with good professions and certain success in our carriers, but we still… 
Mr. van Eijk: Yes, of course. 
Mr. Semaška: It is not only for blue collar, or for students, or for teenagers. It is and organization 
for all the males, all men in Lithuania. We have an increasing number of ladies also joining. So, 
that is, clearly, the effect of aggression against Ukraine. It is caused by a sense of responsibility, 
to be taken on our own shoulders. And, of course, that created a favorable environment for the 
political leadership to go straightly for the increase of defense spending, which almost tripled 
over the past six years.  
Mr. van Eijk: So, I take it you are… 
Mr. Semaška: Tripled. Tripled! 
Mr. van Eijk: Yeah, tripled. Wow. And that in such a small time. 
Mr. Semaška: This year, in nominal terms. In percentage of GDP terms it more than doubled this 
year, in comparison to 2012. But in nominal terms, because of the growth of the economy and 
inflation, it tripled. Almost tripled. Because, then, we were spending. Well, we are a small 
economy, so the nominal figures are not impressive. 
Mr. van Eijk: Well, they are probably not either for us. So, I am not one to judge. 
Mr. Semaška: But, if we were then spending 250 million euros for defense, this year it is about 
725 and next year it will be 855 million euros. So, this year, it will be 1.8 percent of the GDP and 
next year it will be 2.07 percent of the GDP spending on defense. And, actually, that is quite 
sensitive, because, basically, all the proceeds from the growth of the economy go to defense. 
Everything. Not to other sectors, but to defense. So, basically, everywhere, we keep the spending 
at the same level and only what we generate from the growth of the economy goes to defense. 
And now, we are spending on equipment. Also, the ratio that we spent on new armament is very 
good. Thirty percent goes to new equipment. We are buying systems, missile defense… Anti-
aircraft systems. 
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Mr. van Eijk: Are those defense increases and purchases and budgets in any way pooled or sort 
of coordinated between Lithuania and the other two Baltic states? 
Mr. Semaška: Well, Estonia has already for a number of years been spending close to two 
percent, now they have a bit higher than two percent. They were already for a number of years 
pushing us: spend more, spend more. It was not only the Americans; the Estonians were also 
doing that. And when we radically moved in 2014, with these increases, the Latvians followed. 
So, Latvians are also following our heading.  
Mr. van Eijk: Then, lastly, I would like to turn to inter-Baltic cooperation. What kind of forms 
does that take? Because, I have read something… There are… I think there are a myriad of 
different constructions. But, which one of those, would you say, currently, is the most important? 
If you can make such a judgment at all. 
Mr. Semaška: Well, there is a number of… Of course, militarily, it is basically what is happening 
with NATO operations in the area that could only be achieved by the three of us working 
together. The… In spring 2015, two weeks after I spoke at the Future Force Conference, our 
three chiefs of defense signed a letter calling for the deployment of NATO troops in the area.  
Mr. van Eijk: Addressed at General Breedlove, if I am correct. 
Mr. Semaška: Yes. So, what is happening now with NATO operations in the area, from 
enhanced forward presence to NATO Force Integration Units, that are planning the 
reinforcement. They were launched already a year ago launched. They are working on concrete 
plans, well, on an amendment of our defense plans. That is also very important. That is not much 
advertised, but it is very important work that is being done. And now the deployment of air 
policing mission, that is now strengthened with already an airbase operating in Estonia and our 
base continuing to operate, a reserve base in Poland, also ready to contribute if necessary. And 
the deployment of enhanced forward presence. All that is a major, I would say the major, 
trilateral cooperation expression. That we have achieved that and that this goes rather smoothly 
and fluently. In the economic field, well, building up the resilience of our three states, of the 
economies of our three states and the infrastructure. Taking care of critical infrastructure. That is 
again, we do together some major projects, such as detaching from Russian energy supply 
structure. We, of course, still have those pipes coming in. But, for instance, last year, all the gas 
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that we received came not from Russia, but from the world markets; mostly from Norway, via 
the LNG terminal we launched in 2011. The idea was launched in 2011 and at the end of 2014 it 
was launched, put into operation. It was the fastest, ever in the world, implemented LNG project. 
Mr. van Eijk: Wow. 
Mr. Semaška: And now it can serve the whole area.  
Mr. van Eijk: Okay. 
Mr. Semaška: So, it can serve and the use of that will be increased with Latvians also getting rid 
of Gazprom influence in the area and Latvian storage capacity also being used in combination 
with our LNG terminal. Because, you know, when you have this LNG terminal, it is also very 
important to have sufficient storage capacity. To make it so you can buy bigger quantities in the 
time that gas is cheaper, in the summer, and even out the use of the supply. And then, when it 
comes to our electricity grid. Again, already in legal terms, we function as one system and we are 
integrated into the NORDPOOL system. So, with the Nordics, we make one legal framework. 
With the same rules, with the same principles, the same trading system, and the same operator. 
And already since the end of 2015, we are physically also connected. We launched a cable to 
Sweden, from Lithuania, and Estonians launched two cables to Finland. So, now we are in the 
ring, the electricity ring with the Nordics. Functioning physically and legally as one. So, these 
are examples of our infrastructure being made more resilient, and our economies being not 
dependent on supplies from Russia. The last major energy project that we have to do, where we 
cooperate, is to synchronize the functioning of our electricity grid with that of continental 
Europe, with the Central European electricity grid system. Russian electricity is no longer 
competitive in our markets, it is mostly Swedish electricity, or Estonian or Latvian electricity in 
Lithuanian market. Because, when we joined the EU we had to commit to closing off our nuclear 
power plant and we are now decommissioning it, and it was producing 90% of our electricity. 
We were the most nuclear dependent country in the world, much more than France. That was the 
thing that we had to do, that we committed to, you know, in accession negotiations. And, 
therefore, we are a major importer of electricity and these cables to Sweden and Finland, they 
create a situation in which we can import cheaper Nordic electricity. Or, sometimes, in spring 
times, Latvian electricity, because they have a lot of hydro power plants. They export to us. Or 
Estonians using shale, in shale burning power plants. 
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Mr. van Eijk: And this, is this infrastructure the product of Russian energy influence or war, or 
how one may phrase that? 
Mr. Semaška: That very much related to the effort to detach from Russians. But, for the time 
being, the stability, the frequencies, the stability of the frequencies in the system, are maintained 
by Russian facilities, Russian power plants. And we are still in one ring with Russia. Legally, in 
terms of trading, in terms of organizing the market, we are in the NORDPOOL system, but 
physically, in terms of technical maintenance and stability of the frequencies in our area, we are 
still integrated with Russia. And we want also, in the forthcoming few years, to detach from that 
completely. So, that is the last major energy project that we have to do, and in a combined way, 
we address our partners in the EU, we address the European Commission, and we come with a 
joined project. And the commission is funding feasibility studies and preparational work for 
detaching from Russia and fully synchronizing our system with that of Central and Western 
Europe. 
Mr. van Eijk: Okay. That makes total sense. Looking at everything, I think we have basically 
talked about everything that I wanted to discuss. Thank you so much for your time! 
END OF THE TRANSCRIPT 
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Appendix C: Interview Notes Ms. Dobrāja 
Date: 15-06-2017 
Location: The Hague, the Netherlands. 
START OF THE TRANSCRIPT 
Two cases before the International Court of Justice, between the Republic of Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation: 
- Sponsoring Terrorism 
- Suppressing of racial minorities 
Question: Upon regaining independence, what kind of values, threats, and positions did the new 
Latvian state emphasize? What was its world-view? 
1990: The Year in which Latvia regained its independence from the USSR. This process towards 
independence was started in 1988. 
Yet, even under the USSR, the heritage of Latvian statehood remained. 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Latvian nation decreased in numbers. Mostly 
due to the two World Wars. 
Moreover, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which carved up Eastern-Europe and divided it 
between Nazi-Germany and the Soviet Union, all of the Baltic states and most of Poland were 
attributed to the USSR. 
Russia started to build military bases in Latvia, which has a very strategic geopolitical location. 
Furthermore, under the pressure of these soldiers and even tanks, the Latvians established a 
Soviet regime. The USSR claimed that this regime was installed on a voluntary basis and was 
thus legitimate, yet the USSR left the Latvians no choice, rendering this regime oppressive and 
illegitimate. 
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Under this regime the population was purposefully altered. Latvian citizens were deported to 
Siberia on a regular schedule in order to make room for Soviet troops and Soviet workforces, 
which would come to occupy the dwellings of the deported Latvians, which had now been 
nationalized. 
14
th
 of June, 1941: tens of thousands of Latvian citizens were deported to Siberia. 
1944: With the Soviets on the return, the Latvian public knew what was coming and attempted to 
get out. Hundreds of thousands attempted to flee Latvia. Some retreated with the Germans, 
others fled to Sweden and other countries.  
Yet, these Latvian exiles never gave up hope and kept the tradition and political ties of their 
country alive. They kept the tradition of independence alive.  
Correspondence with home was difficult, as contact was only allowed under the constant and 
ever-watchful eyes of the KGB.  
After the regaining of independence, a number of exiles and/or their second generation returned 
to Latvia in order to build up their state and nation.  
Latvian nationals, during World War Two, fought for both the Germans and the Soviets. Both 
forcefully recruited Latvians to fill their ranks.  
After regaining control, the Soviets used the Latvian territory to build factories. In order to 
accommodate all of the workers which were being brought in from all over the USSR, Latvians 
were deported. 
Therefore, right before the regaining of independence, there was about a fifty-fifty balance 
between ethnic Latvians and ethnic Russian-speaking (Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians etc.) 
population within Latvian territory. 
Question: What was the position of the Latvian state vis-à-vis the ethnic Russian minority? 
A generous and permissive position was struck by the Latvian state upon the regaining of 
independence. Since the Latvians did not expel forcefully the ethnic Russian-speaking 
population, provided they harbored loyalty to the Latvian state. The citizenship was not granted 
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automatically, certain requirements had to be fulfilled, such as a certain level of knowledge of 
Latvian language, history, number of years of residence. 
The ethnic Russian-speaking minority forms a “fifth column” in society. 
After the regaining of independence, the Russians regularly accused Latvia of mistreating its 
ethnic Russian population. Upon this basis, Russia started to routinely harass Latvia. 
Such harassment is frequent and comes in every way possible, such as cyber threats and hybrid 
threats. Latvia had to stay vigilant. 
Recently, Russia once again started to spread media propaganda on the militant and aggressive 
position of NATO.  
Yet it is Russia that “infringes Latvian airspace, waters, and economic zone on a daily basis.” 
NATO established a Centre of Excellence for Strategic Communication in Latvia. 
Latvia only has a fairly mall diplomatic and foreign relations capacity, but its structures are 
resilient, competent, flexible. Just like one would expect from a small state. 
The 1990s were marked by the endeavor of state and nation-building. 
Since then, Russia has kept the pressure on Latvia. It continued to exert influence through the 
UN and the OSCE. It employed such councils as the Council on Human Rights and the Council 
on Social and Political Rights as forums of power. 
Therefore, Latvia too had to “react internationally.” 
Question: To what extent is the Latvian ethnic Russian population influenced by this Russian 
propaganda? Does it exist within a Russian media sphere? 
Latvia takes the moral high ground and employs a policy of media freedom, provided the 
Latvian-based channels exhibit some loyalty to the Latvian state. However, signals coming in 
from Russia are not subject to such demands. These Russian-based media channels broadcast the 
most propaganda and are thus a security concern.  
The ethnic Russian minority is indeed influenced by such Russian media propaganda. The part of 
the country that is most affected is the East of Latvia, nearest to the Russian border. Here, under 
84 
 
the USSR, many Russian workers were stationed. These communities exist within a Russian 
media sphere. 
Question: Does Russia use its Latvian ethnic Russian minority to actively influence or disrupt 
Latvian processes? Has it attempted to mobilize the ethnic minority against Latvia itself? 
“We do” see active influencing and mobilizing. 
On the whole, the USSR was less interested in Lithuania than in Latvia. This due to limited sea 
access and their presence in Kaliningrad district. Hence, Lithuania was less subjected to 
purposeful population change. Latvia, however, has 550 kilometers of shoreline, making it a 
strategic priority. 
Therefore, Latvia was “very much threatened.” 
Question: Can we summarize your priorities at the outset of independence as state and nation-
building on a domestic level and negotiating the threat embodied by the Russian Federation on 
the international level? 
“Yes.” 
The same is true for the other Baltic states. At this moment, Lithuania is fencing off its border 
with Kaliningrad. Latvia plans to do the same thing with their borders with Belarus and Russia 
respectively. The reason for this is the illegal immigration originating from Belarus and since 
this border represents the most Eastern border of the Western sphere. 
Question: Is the securing of the border with Belarus really due to illegal immigration and not 
due to this country’s close alignment and integration with Russia? 
Both are concerns, but the former has been officially cited as the reason for the construction of a 
border fence. 
The borders between Latvia and Russia and Belarus are not only the borders to the Latvian state 
but also the most outer rims of the Western sphere.  
However, “the EU and NATO have not paid much attention to their own security” over the past 
years. NATO and the EU, had “other priorities.” 
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On the subject of NATO, the majority of the Latvian public is in favor of the NATO troops that 
were committed at the 2014 Wales and 2016 Warsaw Summits. Latvia is “feeling much safer.” 
Question: Can the same be said for the ethnic Russian minority? 
Not unequivocally. Those within the Russian media sphere regard NATO as a threat, yet the later 
generations of ethnic Russians have integrated into Latvian society rather well. They are more in 
favor of NATO and are “loyal” to Latvia. 
Question: Has Latvia attempted to influence or change these priorities? Since they do not seem 
to fit the Latvian geopolitical position. 
“Yes.” Latvia has “absolutely” attempted to convince NATO of the threat from Russia for years, 
ever since their accession. The Baltics “were like a locomotive” in “getting NATO back on 
track,” back to its military roots. 
Hence, Latvia was “really glad” with the outcome of the 2014 and 2016 Summits, namely the 
committal of troops to the Baltic states, for which they had been calling for years. 
After the Chechen Wars of 1999-2009 and the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the Baltics were 
even more alarmed. The Baltics “were the ones who rang the alarm bell.” Even though no-one 
listened. 
Georgia was the threshold and Crimea was the wake-up call. 
“NATO was not very effective” at addressing the threats coming from Russia. Moreover, it did 
not even recognize these threats until the Crimean Crisis. 
According to Latvia, the Russians are highly unpredictable and “do what they want.” 
“There was nothing much to do about what happened in Georgia. Yet we tried.” Georgia, for the 
Baltics, was a serious lesson. For NATO, it was not more than a hiccup in the relations with 
Russia. 
After Crimea, following Baltic leadership, NATO and the EU reassessed their threat definitions 
to fit the challenges exhibited by Russia. 
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“The main task of Latvian foreign policy currently is to reveal to the international public and 
international organizations the lessons of previous incidents and what they mean for Baltic and 
Western security.” 
Hence, “it was wise of NATO to commit troops.” 
Post-Crimea, Latvia thinks about re-establishing compulsory military service, following the 
Lithuanian lead and a general favor in the public. 
Also, Latvia is strengthening its national guard. 
The “West has lived very carelessly” over the past years. This must be addressed. 
Question: Was Crimea a wake-up call for the West? And if so, were you the ones awake to call 
the West and NATO to attention? Did you take the lead in this process? 
“Yes, Crimea was indeed a wake-up call to the West.” The West finally recognized that 
something “can happen very close to your doorstep.” This must be guarded against. 
Latvia and the Baltics woke the West up, they were awake while the rest of the West was asleep. 
After Crimea and Sevastopol, Eastern Ukraine and the Eastern shore of the Black Sea will be 
Russia’s new targets. 
Question: Since you were the ones who woke the West up, you were the ones who called, were 
you surprised to see the Crimean Crisis happen? 
“We were not surprised” to see the Crimean Crisis unfold. “We were happy to see that our 
alarms concerning the threats from Russia, which were very real and not exaggeration, were 
finally believed.” 
Question: Was the Crimean Crisis a policy window for you? The opportunity you had been 
looking for to present your narrative and finally secure troop support in the process? 
“Yes, the Crimean Crisis served our case, which is a tragic statement, since it is such a tragic 
event, but it is true.” Crimea was indeed the policy window the Baltic states required in order to 
finally securitize Russia, which they had been trying for years. 
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Russia claimed that Crimea was historically Russian and that the intervention was legitimized as 
a consequence. However, Crimea belonged to the Tatars before the Russians showed up. The 
tatars had not always been an ethnic minority in Crimea. 
Question: The only solution to the Russian threat was the presence of NATO troops on Baltic 
soil? 
“Yes.” 
Question: What was the domestic public response to the Crimean Crisis? 
The general though that gripped the Latvian public was that “the Baltics will be next; the next 
case will be the Baltics.” This was a “very alarming and grim picture.” 
Question: Did the ethnic Russian minority share in this alarmed response? 
“Not really.” The ethnic Russian minority did not really respond to the Crimean Crisis, positive, 
negative, or otherwise. 
Furthermore, the Crimean Crisis was also a wake-up call for Latvia itself. Latvia re-evaluated its 
foreign affairs policies and priorities. “Latvians should help” there where they can in 
international affairs. Additionally, projects to “help Ukraine resist” Russian influence were 
established. The government and its foreign affairs team organized panel discussions and debates 
in order to inform the Ukrainian public and provide a sense of recognition. “Crimea awoke in us 
some good developments.” 
Question: Did the Crimean Annexation evoke any parallels with the Soviet occupation of Latvia? 
“Yes, very much so.”  
Question: Would you say that your national security is in essence synonymous with the state of 
international security; that the one equals the other? 
“Yes.” Generally, before the Crimean Crisis, Latvia has “gravely relied on international 
assistance from NATO.” Which never really came in the form that Latvia and the wider Baltics 
would have liked, namely troop support. 
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Therefore, Latvia is focusing on its own capacity. It is doing its best to “reach a defense budget 
of 2% of its GDP, a target which will most likely be met next year.” “We have to take care of 
ourselves as well, we have to carry our own weight.” 
However, before Crimea, under the discourse of constructive engagement, the Western world 
claimed such a level of spending to be unnecessary and highly confrontational. However, now 
“nobody is disputing that, it goes without question. This has to be done.” 
Question: Would you then sum up your foreign policy as “negotiating the East, by engaging and 
at times now leading the West? 
“Yes, precisely.” Over the past years, ever since the Chechen Wars and especially since the 
Russo-Georgian War, Latvia and with it the wider Baltics, have focused on the niche of Russian 
security. Latvia has become a Russia expert, thus leads the West in this association, since the 
West itself is too careless. 
“The West was too naïve.” After the Cold War, the West assumed that Russia would Westernize 
and would attempt to seek constructive cooperation and economic ties with the West. However, 
instead of this, Russia has been building up and modernizing its military, while the West and 
NATO demilitarized. Moreover, the West assumed that Russia would abide by the conventions 
and treaties they signed. This was, unfortunately, not the case. “Russia cannot be trusted, 
unfortunately.” 
“The West now finally recognizes the Russian threat.” Yet, this has taken a long time, which 
means that Russia is “much better adopted and equipped” than the West. 
Question: Would you say that Russia’s transgressions and aggressions are a pattern, a pattern 
that the Baltic states recognized from the very start? 
“Yes, we have recognized this pattern and attempted to alert the West.” Baltic alarms were not 
heeded. 
Question: In a speech following the Crimean intervention, Vladimir Putin motivated his actions 
by referencing the Russian care-taker policy, which states that it is Russia’s duty to protect its 
kin living abroad. Russia accused Ukraine of mistreating its ethnic Russian population and on 
the basis of which it intervened. Does Latvia, which too has a rather sizeable ethnic minority, 
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regard this care-taker policy as a threat? Does Latvia regard this policy as a sign that the 
Baltics are next? 
“Yes, this is indeed a threat.” The general perception of this event is: “the Baltics are next.” 
Question: If the Crimean Crisis was a policy window, what concrete strategies did you employ to 
convince NATO of this Russian threat? How did you bring the message across? 
Crimea was indeed the policy window for which the Baltics had been looking for years. It was 
“painful, but helpful.” 
First, the employment of every forum of interaction as a theater of securitization. The use of a 
boomerang strategy in which the Baltics attempted to sway their NATO-allies through 
engagement in other organizations (EU-presidency, OSCE) and bilateral ties. The importance of 
the present issue and the threat of a belligerent Russia was espoused at any and every 
opportunity. 
Second, the close and “consistent cooperation and show of positions” between the Baltics and 
Poland. A “constant and united position” between these partners was key. 
Third, “the emphasizing on common values and ideologies,” the importance of cooperation and 
the Russian threat to this framework and every nation within it. 
Baltics were looking for concrete reassurances, mostly from NATO and the US. Such as under 
the European Reassurance Mechanism. 
In sum, the discourse change was not based upon voluntary decisions and ad hoc cooperation. 
But premeditation, strategy, and cooperation. 
Question: Is Latvia satisfied with the level of support committed under the 2014 and 2016 NATO 
Summits? 
“Yes, we are very happy with the commitments. We are honored to host these international 
troops.” 
Question: But is this level of support sufficient? 
“Yes, the current plan is sufficient.” It is a big and important step forward. “It sends a very 
powerful sign to Russia.” 
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Question: A sign yes, but is it more than just a sign? Does the current commitment bolster your 
actual national security level? 
“Yes.” 
Question: And what about the Russian military build-up and the constant colossal military drills 
they undertake? Such as the ZAPAD drill, which is supposed to take place right next to the Baltic 
border and will simulate a conflict with NATO and an invasion of the Baltic states. 
While NATO had been downscaling, Russia had been modernizing and increasing its military 
capacity.  
The ZAPAD exercise is regarded with great apprehension and “great caution”, since it takes 
place right next to Latvian and Lithuanian borders. 
Russia claims these drills are in response to the aggression and expansion of NATO, yet in 
reality, Russia is the aggressor and NATO’s responses have been nothing but polite. However, 
the “only thing Russia will respect is force. They see politeness as a weakness.” 
END OF TRANSCRIPT 
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Appendix D: Remarks by Foreign Minister Rinkēvičs 
Remarks by H.E. Mr. Edgars Rinkēvičs 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia 
Ministerial Panel Discussion on Human Rights Situation in Crimea 
 
 
 
Excellences, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen! 
 
I’m pleased to host this important event together with my colleagues – Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs of Ukraine Mr. Pavlo Klimkin and Lithuania Mr. Linas Linkevičius. I also warmly 
welcome all excellent panelists who have honoured us with their presence in today’s discussion. 
 
Almost 3 years ago we were shattered by a blatant violation of international law by the Russian 
Federation – illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and deliberate aggression 
in the eastern Ukraine. Until now there has been no success in finding a peaceful solution. The 
consequences of these illegal acts are not fading away. On the contrary they are becoming 
increasingly alarming.  
 
I am glad that the international community has not stayed silent and these disturbing events have 
been in the spotlight. Last December the United Nations General Assembly made a very clear 
signal by adopting the first resolution on human rights situation in Crimea. Latvia firmly 
supported this crucial initiative condemning widespread human rights violations in the peninsula. 
We join the call to the Russian Federation to comply with its obligations under the international 
law and to ensure unimpeded access of international monitoring bodies to Crimea. 
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Since the annexation we have witnessed appalling disrespect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in Crimea. Russian legislation and forced citizenship have been imposed in breach of 
the international law. We receive daily reports about violations of civil and political rights. These 
violations include extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment of 
detainees and politically motivated prosecutions accompanied by the lack of investigations. 
 
Independent human rights monitors have repeatedly affirmed that the worst affected are ethnic 
and religious minorities, in particular Crimean Tatars, as well as Ukrainian citizens. The 
Amnesty International has confirmed that Crimean Tatars are subject to systematic 
discrimination and persecution. The main bastion of Crimean Tatars self-governance and culture 
– Mejlis – has been banned by the Russian authorities labelling it as an extremist organization. 
Its leaders have been detained, prosecuted or exiled.  
 
 
Freedom of assembly has been severely curtailed. A variety of peaceful gatherings have been 
banned. Civil society and pro-Ukrainian human rights activists are facing a myriad of 
restrictions. The administrative detention of human rights lawyer Emil Kurbedinov on 26 
January continues this disturbing trend.  
 
The space for freedom of speech has shrunk dramatically. There are ongoing efforts to silence 
dissenting voices. Non-violent views, opinions and beliefs are being criminalized. Practically all 
Crimean Tatar media outlets, including television channels and radio stations have been forced to 
cease. The internet access to a number of outlets is blocked. Among others, the OSCE experts 
have expressed particular concern about continued threats and intimidation of media workers. 
 
All these negative developments represent unacceptable attack on basic human rights and civil 
liberties. The Freedom House in its latest annual report has already ranked Crimea as ‘not free’. 
This requires urgent and decisive international response. 
 
As I already emphasized, a number of regional and international organizations, most notably the 
United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, have taken steps to address this alarming 
situation. We have a number of tools at our disposal, including the recently adopted United 
Nations resolution on Crimea. I would also like to commend the valuable work carried out by the 
United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine despite the lack of access to 
Crimea.  
 
Nonetheless the denial of access for international human rights bodies is one of the key obstacles 
to achieving progress. Further isolation of Crimea is not permissible. I would like to once more 
stress the urgent need to ensure unimpeded access of international human rights bodies and non-
governmental organizations to Crimea.  
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For a conclusion I would like to echo the Council of Europe’s report on the human rights visit to 
Crimea: “It is indeed neither normal, nor acceptable, that a population of 2.5 million people 
should be kept beyond the reach of the human rights mechanisms established to protect all 
Europeans.” 
Finally I reiterate that peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine that fully respects Ukraine’s 
independence and territorial integrity must remain a priority. Latvia will remain vocal on our 
indisputable non-recognition policy of the illegal annexation of Crimea. 
 
I look forward to valuable insights of our panelists and enriching discussion. 
 
Thank you 
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Mister President, 
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I would like to thank the Ukrainian presidency of the Security Council for organizing the debate 
on conflicts in Europe. I also thank the Secretaries-General from all the three organizations – 
UN, OSCE and the EU - for their remarks.   
 
Mister President,  
In many regards Europe is a hallmark for peace, stability and prosperity. However, Europe is not 
immune to security and stability challenges. Since the beginning of the century we have witnessed 
serious breaches of the international security rules. The ongoing conflict in the East of Ukraine is 
the most recent threat to security of Europe. Also, the protracted conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia remind us that this is no time for international 
complacency.  
Universal respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty is enshrined in the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter.  It must be adhered to by all. All the UN Member States have 
committed to renounce the illegal threat or use of force. All have agreed to settle their disputes by 
peaceful means.  
Still, Russia’s actions in Ukraine are a blatant violation of international law and a serious challenge 
to the principles of the UN Charter. Three years ago, Russia occupied Crimea. These actions were 
not unprecedented or isolated ones. The international community had witnessed similar acts of 
aggression committed by Russia in Georgia as recent as in 2008. 
We must return to the rules based security order in Europe. There is no universal solution, when it 
comes to the resolution of active and protracted conflicts. But clear consequences for the aggressor, 
resolute international pressure and accountability for violations of international law can be very 
useful to facilitate de-escalation and political resolution of the conflict.   
OSCE and the EU as regional organizations have a natural role in resolving conflicts in Europe. 
We expect these organizations together with the UN to actively engage in the conflict resolution. It 
is in their combined capacity to provide sustainable support for conflict resolution and to facilitate 
crucial political and economic reform processes. 
All parties must remain committed to the international instruments for peaceful conflict resolution. 
That includes support for and facilitation of unhindered deployment of the UN, OSCE and the EU 
international missions.  It is unacceptable, when territories of conflict are inaccessible to 
international monitoring mechanisms.  They have provided and excellent platform for 
reconciliation, as in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Until Russia vetoed the 
mandates of UNOMIG and OSCE missions.    
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In order to prevent the escalation, the UN Security Council should pay closer attention to the 
existing conflicts in Europe. The veto-wielding Security Council members have not only the 
privilege, but, and mainly, responsibility in the interests of common peace and security. Their 
national interests must not hamper constructive efforts in fulfilling their role as the permanent 
members. 
We appreciate the UN Secretary-General’s participation today and his continuous appeal for peace 
and settlement of all conflicts. We encourage the Secretary-General not to shy away from using his 
good offices when necessary. We call on him to use all the tools at his disposal to preserve the 
rules-based international order and to restore it, where it has been broken. 
 
Mr. President,  
The peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine that respects Ukraine’s independence and 
territorial integrity must remain high on the international agenda. Latvia will remain vocal on our 
indisputable non-recognition policy of the illegal annexation of Crimea.  
Unfortunately, there is no progress towards resolution of the conflict. The latest escalation of 
violence by Russia’s supported separatists in the Eastern Ukraine and Russia’s decision to 
recognize passports issued by separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk regions undermines the Minsk 
Agreements.    
Latvia reiterates that full implementation of the Minsk Agreements remains our unchanged 
benchmark. The OSCE Special Monitoring mission must continue observing and assessing the 
implementation progress. The monitoring officers must be granted full, safe and unrestricted access 
to all conflict-affected areas, including the disengagement zones, heavy armaments storage sites 
and the Russian-Ukrainian border. We also believe that the Normandy Format must continue its 
efforts to bring the devastation in Eastern Ukraine to an end.  
To conclude, settlement of protracted conflicts in wider Europe remains of utmost importance. Not 
only more efforts, but, mainly, political will is needed to achieve peaceful resolution of the conflict 
in Georgia, Transnistrian conflict and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The commitment to the 
established engagement formats and support to international missions, as demonstrated, for 
example under the OSCE auspices, by signing of the Berlin Protocol in 2016 regarding the 
Transnistria conflict, is the only sustainable way toward conflict resolution. 
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Mr. President,  
The best way of preventing conflicts is solving the existing ones in the most efficient ways. It is 
important to continue joint efforts to find political resolution of all the remaining conflicts in 
Europe. 
 
Thank you. 
